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THE CHARLESTON POLICY: SUBSTANCE OR ABUSE?
Kimani Paul-Emile*
In 1989, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) adopted a
policy that, according to subjective criteria, singled out for drug testing,
certain women who sought prenatal care and childbirth services would be
tested for prohibited substances. Women who tested positive were
arrested, incarcerated and prosecuted for crimes ranging from
misdemeanor substance possession to felony substance distribution to a
minor. In this Article, the Author argues that by intentionally targeting
indigent Black women for prosecution, the MUSC Policy continued the
United States legacy of their systematic oppression and resulted in the
criminalizing of Black Motherhood.
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INTRODUCTION
Reinforcing centuries of race, class and gender biases, in 1989
the Medical University of South Carolina' ("MUSC") instituted the
Interagency Policy of Management of Substance Abuse During
Pregnancy ("Policy"). Created as part of a collaboration between the
City of Charleston, South Carolina ("Charleston"), the Charleston
Police Department ("CPD"), Ninth Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office
("Solicitor's Office") and MUSC, the Policy sanctioned the Solicitor's
Office to criminally prosecute substance-dependent pregnant
women under the state's child endangerment laws. The Policy es-
tablished a protocol which required: (i) testing, without consent,
women who sought obstetrical care; (ii) disclosing the results of
these tests to third persons; (iii) arresting women who tested posi-
tive; and (iv) criminally prosecuting them.
Purportedly established "to ensure appropriate management of
patients abusing illegal drugs during pregnancy," 2 the Policy pun-
ished, instead of treated, women who became pregnant while
substance addicted and who chose to carry their pregnancies to
term. While the Policy implementers maintained that their actions
were intended only to help endangered children and deter pregnant
women from self-destructive behavior, virtually every woman ar-
rested pursuant to the Policy was Black.
Under the new Policy, Black women were arrested in vastly
disproportionate numbers relative to their approximately thirty-
three percent of the general Charleston area population.3 During the
first eight months of the Policy, all of the women reported by MUSC
to the Solicitor's Office and subsequently arrested and incarcerated
by the CPD were Black.4 In fact, during the entire period that the
Policy was enforced, all but one of the women reported to the CPD
and arrested were Black, and the one White woman reported was
distinguished in medical charts as having a "Negro boyfriend." 5
Equally troubling is the fact that these women were arrested
and prosecuted only for their addiction to cocaine. This was not-
withstanding the fact that substance addiction is a disease and thus
1. MUSC is a state-administered hospital located in Charleston, South Carolina
that receives both state and federal funding.
2. Medical University of South Carolina, Policy M-7, Management of Drug Abuse
During Pregnancy, in MUSC MEDICAL CENTER POLICY MANUAL (1989) [hereinafter
Management of Drug Abuse During Pregnancy].
3. See Brief of Appellants at 25, Ferguson v. City of Charleston (4th Cir. Apr. 7,
1998) (No. 97-2512).
4. See id. at 23.
5. See Joint Appendix at 1366-69, Ferguson v. City of Charleston (4th Cir. Apr.
7, 1998) (No. 97-2512) [hereinafter JA], noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 23.
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not subject to criminal penalties. Moreover, the Policy targeted cocaine-
dependent women despite medical evidence showing that cocaine does
not cause irreversible harm to a fetus. The Policy's underlying assump-
tion that cocaine is singularly and irreversibly harmful to a fetus, though
widely believed, is actually unsupported by medical science. Given the
consensus of the medical community on the issue of drug depend-
ency during pregnancy, MUCS's institution of the Policy was not
accidental-nor was its particular impact upon indigent Black women.
Women who tested positive for cocaine during prenatal visits
or hospitalizations prior to delivery were ostensibly entitled to an
opportunity to receive treatment before they were arrested. How-
ever, the implementers of the Policy were well aware that the
Charleston area lacked drug treatment facilities equipped to provide
the services necessary to meet the needs of low-income pregnant
women and new mothers.6 Indeed, there were no substance abuse
treatment programs that provided any kind of child care, which cre-
7ated a tremendous barrier to treatment for many pregnant women.
Thus, the Policy frightened pregnant women away from necessary
medical attention. This was so despite the fact that the most effective
way of ensuring and protecting maternal and fetal health is to pro-
vide substance abuse treatment and proper prenatal care.8
6. Until 1992, there was not one drug treatment program in all of South Caro-
lina designed to meet the specific needs of pregnant and parenting substance-
addicted women and their children. See SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON ALCOHOL
AND DRUG ABUSE, ANNUAL REPORT 1991-1992 66 (1992) (announcing the April 1992
opening of South Carolina's first residential treatment program for women). In
addition, MUSC's own treatment center did not accept pregnant women. See CENTER
FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW & POLICY, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM IN Focus, PUNISHING
WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY: AN APPROACH THAT UN-
DERMINES WOMEN'S HEALTH AND CHILDREN'S INTERESTS 4 (1996) [hereinafter
PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY].
7. According to Louise Haynes, the Director of the Office of Women's Services
for the South Carolina Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse from 1988 to 1992 (a
state agency designed to develop substance abuse treatment programs for women),
in the fall of 1989 there were no substance abuse treatment facilities in the Charleston
area that provided any kind of child care. See JA, supra note 5, at 903, noted in Brief of
Appellants, supra note 3, at 21. This created a significant barrier to women with
children seeking treatment. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 21.
8. See Helene M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663,
2668-69 (1990).
[I]t is often too late to ensure a healthy pregnancy once it has be-
gun.... The birth of a healthy baby, then, depends in part on the
woman's general health and well-being before conception as well as
on the amount and quality of prenatal care. Health care before preg-
nancy can ameliorate disease, improve risk status, and help prepare
the woman for childbearing.
Robert H. Blank, Maternal-Fetal Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 73, 84 (1993).
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Women who tested positive at the time of delivery were denied
treatment as an alternative to arrest and incarceration and were
summarily arrested.9 All told, the CPD arrested thirty women,' °
many of whom were still recovering from delivery. One woman was
handcuffed to her bed throughout delivery. Others, weak and in
pain, still bleeding heavily from childbirth, vomiting, and dressed
only in hospital gowns, were shackled and taken to holding cells,
where they were made to wait for hours. Some women were even
handcuffed to chains that went around their stomachs. 12 One woman
was allowed only a blanket to cover her hospital gown as she was
wheeled half-naked out of the hospital to a waiting police car.'3
Many of those arrested were not given the opportunity to con-
tact family members to arrange for the care of their young children.
Some women were jailed during their pregnancies, taken to the
hospital for delivery, and then returned to jail in shackles and
chains. 4 In one instance, on October 7, 1989, a woman checked into
MUSC eight months pregnant and experiencing premature labor.
After her condition stabilized three days later, a nurse told the
woman that she was being released to go home. However, soon
thereafter, policemen arrested her in her hospital room. She was
handcuffed, shackled, and taken out of the hospital in a wheelchair.
Though she was informed that her arrest was for distribution of
cocaine to a minor, she was not told that the minor in question was
her fetus. Her bail was set at $80,000. She spent five hours in a
holding cell, then three weeks in a sick bay at the jail. She was trans-
ported back and forth from the jail to MUSC for treatment for
premature labor, all the while handcuffed and shackled to the hospi-
tal bed.'
Another woman targeted under the Policy gave birth on Octo-
ber 13, 1989. Despite the fact that she was bleeding so profusely that
she needed four sanitary napkins to absorb the blood and had
passed a small clot the night before, she was arrested the next
morning while in the recovery room and charged with child neglect.
The woman was transported to the police station handcuffed,
wearing only a hospital gown open at the back. Because she was still
9. See JA, supra note 5, at 182, 1417; Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 20.
10. Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 23 ("Of the 30 women who were reported
to the police and arrested throughout the entire Policy, 29 were African American
and the one White woman had a 'Negro boyfriend,' as was noted by Nurse Shirley
Brown in the woman's medical records.").
11. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 17-20.
12. See JA, supra note 5, at 181, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 18.





bleeding and experiencing severe pain, she had to be assisted into
both the police car and the station. Once at the station, she was kept
in a holding cell for four to five hours and later brought to a larger
facility. She was handcuffed and shackled at all times, still dressed
in the revealing hospital gown which, by this time, was soaked in
blood. She was never offered any help with her continued bleeding.16
The Policy was in place from 1989 through 1994, even though it:
(i) disproportionately impacted women of color; (ii) placed an un-
constitutional burden on women's right to reproductive freedom;
(iii) unlawfully criminalized the health status of pregnant, sub-
stance-dependent women; (iv) undermined, rather than improved,
maternal and fetal health; (v) did not reduce cocaine use, improve
pregnancy outcomes, or increase the number of women successfully
completing drug treatment; and (vi) contravened the consensus of
medical, public health and children's rights organizations across the
country that such policies are inimical to maternal and fetal health
and welfare.
On September 1, 1994, MUSC discontinued the Policy after the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Health and Human
Services threatened to cancel federal funding. Less than three weeks
later, the Federal Office of Protection from Research Risks, following
a separate investigation, placed MUSC on probation for its involve-
ment in the Policy, which it found to constitute unethical human
experimentation.17 These federal investigations were prompted by a
multimillion dollar civil rights lawsuit filed in 1993 against the City
of Charleston, South Carolina, by women who sought obstetrics care
from MUSC but instead were arrested pursuant to the Policy.1
8
While the federal enforcement actions against MUSC focused
on the hospital's violations of the law and medical ethical standards,
they did not address the degree to which the Policy was rooted in a
desire to penalize Black women for their decision to carry their
pregnancies to term while substance-addicted. This article seeks to
demonstrate that the Policy punished Black women for their health
status and their decision to continue wanted pregnancies, and
16. See id. at 19.
17. See Philip H. Jos et al., The Charleston Policy on Cocaine Use During Pregnancy:
A Cautionary Tale, 23 J.L. MED. & MED. ETHics 120, 120 (1995) (noting that because the
MUSC ignored requisite procedures, the renewal of its Multiple Project Assurance
was deferred for at least one year and that MUSC was required to take corrective
action) (citing letter to MUSC officials dated Sept. 30, 1994 from the Compliance
Oversight Branch, Division of Human Subjects Protection, Office of Protection from
Research Risks).
18. Ferguson et al. v. City of Charleston et al., No. 2-93-2624-2 (D.S.C. filed Oct.
5, 1993) (challenge brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Policy
violated plaintiffs' constitutional and federal statutory rights and constituted an
abuse of process under South Carolina common law).
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concomitantly deterred women from seeking necessary prenatal care
and assistance from health and social service professionals. MUSC's
Policy not only had a decided bias against Black and indigent
women,'9 but was the product of a society that has chosen to make
race and gender the centerpieces of its social policy for hundreds of
years. To examine these prosecutions in an ahistorical context would
mask the underlying racism, misogyny and discrimination inherent
in the Policy. Tactics such as those employed by MUSC have histori-
cally been used to subordinate women of color by controlling and
restricting their reproductive autonomy.
In this article, I will attempt to lift the veil of apparent coinci-
dence and reveal that racism and gender bias were intrinsic to, if not
the driving force behind, the implementation of the Policy. Part I
will outline the development and implementation of the Policy,
while Part II will examine the Policy within an historical context,
thereby exposing the full meaning, significance and implications of
incarcerating pregnant, substance-dependent Black women. Under
this framework, Part III will examine each aspect of the Policy in
order to demonstrate the ways in which the Policy not only detri-
mentally impacted, but specifically singled out Black women for
discriminatory treatment.
Finally, Part IV will explore the implications of targeting pri-
marily Black women for prosecution and expose the ways in which
the Policy impacted the material condition of Black mothers and the
health and welfare of their children. This Part will also make clear
the gross injustice inherent in using the criminal justice system, in-
stead of the health care system, to address a public health issue. In
addition, Part IV will argue that the Policy dangerously allowed the
interests of the fetus to subsume those of the mother. In so doing, the
Policy unconstitutionally burdened the women's fundamental rights
to liberty, privacy and reproductive freedom by punishing them for
their decision to carry their pregnancies to term.
In sum, by addressing these aspects of a larger social problem
that primarily implicate Black women, and by choosing the criminal
justice system as the remedial mechanism, the implementers of the
Policy created an unconstitutional and extremely ill-advised program.
19. See Blank, supra note 8, at 90; see also Jos et al., supra note 17, at 124; Dorothy
E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1432-36 (1991) (arguing that prosecution of
drug-addicted mothers today is a violation of equal protection); Ira J. Chasnoff, et al.,
The Prevalence of Illicit Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in
Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1202
(1990) (finding that despite similar numbers of positive results in first prenatal visits




The Policy not only targeted Black women in the scope of its applica-
tions and effects, but specifically singled them out for punitive
treatment. In this way, the creators and implementers of the Policy
criminalized Black motherhood.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY
In the late summer of 1989, Shirley Brown ("the Nurse"), a case
manager in the Obstetrics Department at MUSC, became concerned
about what she described as an "epidemic among pregnant Black
women of cocaine abuse or addiction." 20 Her interest stemmed from
a radio report covering the arrest of a pregnant, drug dependent
woman under South Carolina's child abuse statute in another part of
the state. 1 On the same day she heard the report, the Nurse ap-
proached MUSC's general counsel, who then wrote a letter about
this occurrence to then South Carolina Solicitor Charles Condon.
22
Soon thereafter, MUSC's general counsel formed an ad hoc task
force consisting of representatives from MUSC, the Solicitor's Office
and the CPD.' The task force convened its first meeting on Septem-
ber 18, 1989. 24
At the meeting, Condon notified the task force that he inter-
preted the term "child" in the state's child neglect statute2s and the
20. See JA, supra note 5, at 1396, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 4.
21. In relevant part, South Carolina's statute dealing with unlawful conduct
towards children provides:
(A) It is unlawful for a person who has charge or custody of a child,
who is the parent or guardian of a child, or who is responsible for
the care and support of a child to:
(1) place the child at unreasonable risk of harm affecting the child's
life, physical or mental health, or safety;
(2) do or cause to be done unlawfully or maliciously any bodily
harm to the child so that the life or health of the child is endan-
gered or likely to be endangered; or
(3) willfully abandon the child.
(B) A person who violates subsection (A) is guilty of a felony and for
each offense, upon conviction, must be fined in the discretion of the
court or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (West Supp. 1998).
22. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 4.
23. See id. The task force was comprised of: (i) MUSC representatives-e.g., the
Nurse, Drs. Roger Newman and Edgar Horger III, the current and former Directors
of MUSC's Maternal, Fetal Medicine Division, respectively, and General Counsel Joe
Good; (ii) representatives from the Solicitor's Office, including Solicitor Charles
Condon; and (iii) CPD representatives, including Police Chief Reuben Greenberg. See
id. at 4-5.
24. See id. at 5.
25. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (West Supp. 1998).
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word "person" under the state statute criminalizing the "distribution
[of controlled substances] to minors under eighteen" to include vi-
able fetuses.26 His strikingly broad interpretation of those terms
provided the basis for extending the statutes to cover maternal use
of substances during pregnancy that could potentially harm a fetus.
At that time, no South Carolina court had ever read the statutes to
cover viable fetuses,27 and the South Carolina Legislature had re-
peatedly considered and rejected attempts to expand the reach of the
state's child endangerment laws to include fetuses and pregnant
women's drug use.28 Yet, according to Condon's interpretation, ma-
ternal use of harmful substances had to be reported pursuant to state
statute. This was so notwithstanding the fact that proof of harm to
the child was not required.
The task force members decided to test a targeted group of
pregnant patients at MUSC for drugs and to report positive test
results for cocaine directly to the participating law enforcement
agencies-the CPD and the Solicitor's Office. Pursuant to this pro-
gram, which would later become the Policy, the obstetric service of
MUSC adopted a protocol for treating pregnant women who sought
health care at the hospital.29 This protocol did not apply to MUSC's
private obstetrical patients.
In accordance with the protocol, women who wished to receive
obstetric care from MiUSC were required to sign a consent to medical
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440 (West Supp. 1998) provides that:
Any person eighteen years of age or over who.. .distribut[es] a con-
trolled substance [including] crack cocaine to a person under
eighteen years of age is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must
be imprisoned for not more than twenty years or fined not more than
thirty thousand dollars, or both, and the sentence may not be sus-
pended and probation may not be granted.
27. Although Condon's interpretation was later adopted by the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), it has been
rejected by every other court in the nation to consider it. See e.g., Wisconsin ex rel.
Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Wis. 1997) (rejecting forced commit-
ment of a pregnant women into drug treatment in order to protect the fetus); State v.
Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 342 n.13 (Fla. 1997) (stating that expectant mother may not be
criminally charged with the death of her child resulting from self-inflicted injuries
during the third trimester of pregnancy).
28. See Arlene Levinson, Cocaine Mom's Case Spotlights Fetus Rights, POST &
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), March 15, 1998 at 7B. (Condon stated, "[i]n our state, the
rights of the fetus don't come from the mother, they come from God."); S.1495 (1989-
1990), reintroduced as S.75 (1990-1991) (to, inter alia, require drug testing of new-
borns).
29. See Edgar 0. Horger, III et al., Cocaine in Pregnancy: Confronting the Problem,
86 J. S.C. MED. Ass'N. 527, 528-29 (1990).
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treatment form which included consent for a urine screen.3 Drug
screens were performed only on patients who exhibited certain indi-
cators of drug use, including: no prenatal care; late prenatal care
after 24 weeks of gestation; incomplete prenatal care; abruptio pla-
centae; intrauterine fetal death; preterm labor; intrauterine growth
retardation; previously known drug or alcohol abuse; and unex-
plained congenital abnormalities. 3' The Policy defined illegal drugs
as "heroin, crack/cocaine, amphetamines, and any other drug ille-
gally ingested by the patient that medical authorities deemed a
threat to the life and safety of the unborn child." 32 Urine samples
obtained from the targeted patients then entered a legal chain of
custody. 33
If a patient's drug screen indicated drug use, she was to be
shown a film on the dangers of cocaine use during pregnancy34 and
provided a statement to sign indicating that she understood the
potential harm and consequences of continued drug use. At that
time, an appointment with the substance abuse clinic, and follow-up
appointments with the obstetrics clinic, were to be made for the
patient. In addition, according to the protocol, those patients who
screened positive for drug use were to be given a written statement
from the Solicitor indicating that they had been offered an opportu-
nity for rehabilitation, and that they would be arrested if they failed
to get substance abuse treatment and prenatal care.35
CPD operational guidelines mandated the drafting of criminal
reports and the issuance of arrest warrants for those patients who
tested positive for drugs and who failed to attend a scheduled ap-
pointment for substance abuse treatment or prenatal care.3 Patients
who tested positive for the substances outlined in the Policy a sec-.
ond time were to be taken into immediate custody upon release
from the hospital, even if the CPD was unable to obtain an arrest
warrant. Similarly, any patient who delivered an infant who tested
positive for the substances delineated in the Policy was to be ar-
rested immediately upon medical release, and her newborn
removed and placed in protective custody by the Department of
Social Services. The patient was to be charged with possession of an
illegal substance if the gestation was twenty-seven weeks or less,
30. See STATE COUNCIL ON MATERNAL, INFANT AND CHILD HEALTH, OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNOR, 3 1991 SOUTH CAROLINA STUDY OF DRUG USE AMONG WOMEN
GIVING BIRTH: LEGAL ISSUES 25-26 (1992) [hereinafter MICH REPORT VOL. III].
31. See JA, supra note 5, at 1415; Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 7.
32. Management of Drug Abuse During Pregnancy, supra note 2, at 9.
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and possession and distribution of an illegal substance to a person
under eighteen if gestation was twenty-eight weeks or more.7 If the
patient or her child tested positive for drugs during delivery, she
was to be charged with unlawful neglect of a child.3
Implemented on October 1, 1989 and formally adopted eleven
days later as the "Policy,"39 these arrangements resulted in arrests
pursuant to the Policy even before the first memorandum regarding
the adoption of the Policy had been distributed to MUSC personnel,
and over a month before the MUSC Executive Committee's approval
of the Policy on November 27, 1989.40
II. THE POLICY EMBODIES THE LONG-STANDING SOCIAL TREND OF
CRIMINALIZING BLACK MOTHERHOOD
In order to clarify the meaning and implications of targeting
these Black women for prosecution, this case must be placed in an
historical context. Over the last two centuries, tactics and policies
such as the one employed by MUSC have been used to subordinate
women of color by controlling and restricting their reproductive
autonomy. From the horrors of the Middle Passage and slavery
through the state sponsored abuses of Jim Crow to modem day ra-
cism and sexism, Black women have had an experience distinct from
that of their Black brethren and White women.4' Black women have
37. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(c)(1) (West Supp. 1998) (defining the first
offense of possession of cocaine as a misdemeanor carrying a maximum two year
sentence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370 and § 44-53-440 (West Supp. 1998) (stating
that distribution of crack cocaine to a person under age eighteen carries a maximum
sentence of twenty years).
38. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (West Supp. 1998) (describing unlawful con-
duct towards a child as a felony carrying a maximum sentence of ten years).
39. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 6.
40. See id.
41. The first Black women to come to the United States arrived in 1619 in Jame-
stown, Virginia, on a seized Spanish cargo ship and were offered, in exchange for
food, to Dutch sailors. See LERONE BENNETT JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER 29-30
(Penguin Books 5th ed. 1985) (1962); see also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE
MATTER OF COLOR 20-22 (1978) (discussing the status of the first twenty Blacks to
arrive in Jamestown in 1619). In 1705, the Virginia General Assembly announced that
"'[a]ll Negro, mulatto and Indian slaves shall be held, taken and adjudged to be real
estate, in the same category as livestock and household furniture, wagons, and
goods."' KATHY RUSSELL ET AL., THE COLOR COMPLEX 11 (1992).
En route to the colonies, slave women were tortured in ways that Black men
were not.
The placing of African men in chains was to prevent possible upris-
ings. As white slavers feared resistance and retaliation at the hands of
African men, they placed as much distance between themselves and
black male slaves as was possible on board. It was only in relation-
[VOL. 4:325
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inherited a unique legacy of physical, sexual and psychological
brutalization.4 Because this experience has been systematically ig-
nored and marginalized, the privileged body politic, through
legislative and judicial action, has constructed an image of "Black
motherhood" that denies the realities of history.4
Both an economic and political system, American slavery was
an institution under which Whites, through the threat or use of
force, bled as much labor as possible from Blacks and people of
ship to the black female slave that the white slaver could exercise
freely absolute power, for he could brutalize and exploit her without
fear of harmful retaliation. Black female slaves moving freely about
the deck were a ready target for any white male who might choose to
physically abuse and torment them. Initially every slave on board the
ship was branded with a hot iron. A cat-o'-nine-tails was used by the
slavers to lash those Africans that cried out in pain or resisted the
torture. Women were lashed severely for crying. They were stripped
of their clothing and beaten on all parts of their body.... After the
branding, all slaves were stripped of any clothing. The nakedness of
the African female served as a constant reminder of her sexual vul-
nerability. Rape was a common method of torture slavers used to
subdue recalcitrant black women. The threat of rape or other physical
brutalization inspired terror in the psyches of displaced African fe-
males. Robert Shufeldt, an observer of the slave trade, documented
the prevalence of rape on slave ships. He asserts, "In those days
many a negress was landed upon our shored [sic] already impreg-
nated by someone of the demonic crew that brought her over."
BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN 17-18 (1981). See generally GERDA LERNER, BLACK
WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA (1972) (discussing how Black women have been denied
their own history, and providing an interpretation of their history so that they may
have an autonomous definition).
42. As Lemer has described:
The sexual exploitation of black women by white men was so wide-
spread as to be general. Some black women made the best of an
inescapable necessity; others tried to strike an advantageous bargain.
Many were assaulted not by their masters but by overseers, neigh-
boring youth or the master's sons. The point here is that such
exploitation was always possible and could in no way be fought or
avoided-it was yet another way in which the total helplessness of
the slave against arbitrary authority was institutionalized.
LERNER, supra note 41, at 46; see also JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF
SORROW 19 (1985) ("Indeed, in the severity of punishment meted out to slaves, little
distinction was made between the sexes. Black women attained parity with black
men in terms of their productive abilities in the cotton fields; as a result they often
received a proportionate share of the whippings. In response to an interviewer's
inquiry, a former Virginia slave declared, 'Beat women! Why sure he [master] beat
women. Beat women jes lak men. Beat women naked an' wash 'em down in
brine.' ").
43. See infra pp. 14-24.
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mixed race.44 By law, both male and female slaves were denied all
basic rights, including property ownership, literacy and the ability
to maintain the integrity of their families. However, although slave
women were expected to toil in fields alongside male slaves, they
were also forced to engage in domestic work for their captors, tend
to their masters' children, and then find time to care for and nurture
their own families.4
Slave women were not only denied basic freedoms, but lacked
protection from social, economic and sexual abuses. According to
one historian of the slave trade:
Christopher Nichols, an escaped slave living in Canada,
remembered how his master laid a woman on a bench,
threw her clothes over her head, and whipped her. An-
other refugee remembered that when his mother was
whipped, she was stripped completely naked: "Dey
44. See JONES, supra note 42, at 13 (discussing Black women in slavery); see also
LERNER, supra note 41, at 5 (discussing the plantation slave system).
45. As Jones has stated:
The definition of slave women's work is problematical. If work is any
activity that leads either directly or indirectly to the production of
marketable goods, then slave women did nothing but work. Even
their efforts to care for themselves and their families helped to
maintain the owner's work force and to enhance its overall produc-
tivity. Tasks performed within the family context--childcare,
cooking, and washing clothes, for example-were distinct from labor
carried out under the lash in the field or under the mistress's watch-
ful eye in the Big House.
JONES, supra note 42, at 14.
During the 1850's, at least 90% of slave women over the age of sixteen worked
more than 261 days per year, eleven to thirteen hours per day. See id. at 18. In a 1937
interview, a Kentucky ex-slave described her experiences under slavery:
"The things that my sister May and I suffered were so terrible.... It
is best not to have such things in our memory.... Work, work,
work," she said it had consumed all her days (from dawn until mid-
night) and all her years (she was only eight when she began minding
her master's children and helping the older women with their spin-
ning). "I been so exhausted working, I was like an inchworm
crawling along a roof. I worked till I thought another lick would kill
me." On Sundays, "the only time they Ithe slaves] had to them-
selves," she recalled, women washed clothes and some of the men
tended their small tobacco patches. As a child she loved to play in the
haystack, but that was possible only on "Sunday evenings, after
work."
Id. at 13.
Another former slave explained that as a girl, no matter how cold the tem-
perature, she was forced to plow with a mule: "'Sometimes me hands get so cold I
jes' cry.'" Id. at 18.
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didn't care nothing 'bout it. Let everybody look on at
it." Similarly, Henry Bibb reported a whipping where a
woman's "naked quivering flesh" was "tied up and ex-
posed to the public gaze of all."
Without doubt, some whippings of female slaves
were sexually suggestive. The man who whipped
Henry Bibb's wife was often heard by Bibb to exclaim
that "he had rather paddle a female than eat when he
was hungry." The whipping of a thirteen-year-old
Georgia slave girl also had sexual overtones. The girl
was put on all fours "sometimes her head down and
sometimes her head up" and beaten until froth ran from
her mouth. Solomon Northup's master was not above
whipping his slave Patsey in such a manner, either. Ac-
cording to Northup, Master Epps was a man possessed
with "brute passion." Nothing satisfied him more than
having a few drinks and whipping Patsey.4
Black women were severely abused under the institution of
slavery, almost beyond definition, in that they were sexually and
physically assaulted by both Black and White men,47 and were vic-
timized with equal cruelty by White women. Often angered by their
husbands' illicit sexual relationships with their essentially powerless
female slaves, White women frequently vented their rage not at their
husbands but at their perceived rivals. 8 Indeed, slave women who
gave birth to light-skinned children often felt the wrath of irate
wives who, suspecting that their husbands had fathered the chil-
dren, frequently sold the children off.49
Moreover, White women were known to dole out whippings
and punishment as viciously and cruelly as their male counterparts.
While White women in the antebellum South were also ultimately
victimized by the institution of slavery since White men used the
subjugation of women and people of color to maintain their patriar-
chal dominance, this powerlessness often manifested itself as rage
against slave women. Indeed, it is well documented that "some of
the most sadistic behavior inflicted on female house servants was at
46. DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN? 33 (1985).
47. See id. at 152-53.
48. Lerner notes that "Black women frequently fought tenaciously though un-
successfully against the degrading and hated illicit relationships with their masters.
In such cases, they suffered cruel punishment until they succumbed. Frequently this
drew upon them the hatred and enmity of their mistresses." LERNER, supra note 41, at
46.
49. See WHITE, supra note 46, at 41.
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the hands of White wives in retaliation for their husbands' affairs."5
According to one account:
[A] white mistress returned home unexpectedly from an
outing, opened the doors of her dressing room, and dis-
covered her husband raping a thirteen year old slave
girl. She responded by beating the girl and locking her
in a smokehouse. The girl was whipped daily for sev-
eral weeks. When older slaves pleaded on the child's
behalf and dared to suggest that the white master was
to blame, the mistress simply replied, "She'll know bet-
ter in the future. After I've done with her, she'll never
do the likes again through ignorance. 51
A. The Iconography of Black Female Sexuality
The American system of slavery fostered the separation of the
categories of race and gender which led to the sexualization of race
and the creation of the stereotypes surrounding Black female sexu-
ality and motherhood. As a result of this dichotomy, the experience
of antebellum Black women was different from that of any other
group in this country. 2 Slave women were subjected to a double
oppression that neither White women nor Black men endured 3
Under slavery, Black women had little, if any, protection from
the assaults that they were forced to sustain at the hands of their
captors as Southern laws did not even consider the rape of a Black
50. RUSSELL, supra note 41, at 21.
51. HOOKS, supra note 41, at 36-37 (citing STANLEY FELDSTEIN, ONCE A SLAVE 132
(1971)).
52. See id. at 28 ("The impossible task confronts the black woman. If she is res-
cued from the myth of the negro, the myth of the woman traps her. If she escapes the
myth of the woman, the myth of the negro still ensnares her. Since the myth of the
woman and the myth of the negro are so similar, to extract her from one gives the
appearance of freeing her from both.").
53. As Lemer has described:
In general, the lot of black women under slavery was in every respect
more arduous, difficult and restricted than that of the men. Their
work and duties were the same as that of the men, while childbearing
and rearing fell upon them as as [sic] an added burden. Punishment
was meted out to them regardless of motherhood, pregnancy or
physical infirmity. Their affection for their children was used as a
deliberate means of tying them to their masters, for children could
always be held as hostage in case of the mother's attempted escape.
The chances of escape for female slaves were fewer than those for
males. Additionally, the sexual exploitation and abuse of black
Women by White men was a routine practice.
LERNER, supra note 41, at 15.
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woman a crime"4 In fact, from emancipation through more than two-
thirds of this century, not one Southern White man was convicted of
raping or attempting to rape a Black woman.5 The crime, however,
was so pervasive that according to the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence, the low number of reported
incidents of such rapes by 1969 indicated not that the crime was a
rare occurrence, but rather that "white males have long had nearly
institutional access to Negro women with relatively little fear .of
being reported."-'
It was not until 1860 that the Mississippi state legislature en-
acted legislation criminalizing the rape of a Black woman.57 The
crime was made punishable by death or whipping. The law applied
solely to Black men and covered only the rape or attempted rape of
Black females under the age of twelve.m Because the law could only
be enforced against a Black male perpetrator and the victim had to
be a child, the statute effectively codified the vulnerability of Black
women to rape.
Countless slave women were violated and ravaged by a country
that denied them basic freedoms, including the right to their own
bodies. Slave women were not recognized as human beings, much
less women, and were therefore denied access to the conventional
standards of female treatment. The White male power structure
enforced the Victorian code of modesty on White women, and the
sensibilities of the pre-revolutionary South dictated that the proto-
typical woman be "the ideal wife and mother; as good as possible,
54. During the 1859 trial of a slave sentenced to death in the rape of a ten-year-
old female slave, the judge held that "the original indictment could not be sustained
under common law or under the statutes of Mississippi because 'it charges no of-
fence known to either system.... There is no act which embraces either the
attempted or actual commission of a rape by a slave on a female slave.'" Similarly, in
another case, a Tennessee judge remanded a slave to jail for attempting to rape a
White woman, stating that "what gave 'the offense its enormity' was the fact that
[the victim] was white.' Such an act committed on a black woman, would not,' he
noted, 'be punished with death."' WHITE, supra note 46, at 152 (emphasis in origi-
nal). See generally George (a slave) v. State, 37 Miss. 316, 320 (1859) (holding that no
legal remedy is available for the rape of a female slave child because "masters and
slaves cannot be governed by the same common system of laws: so different are their
positions, rights, and duties."); EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 33 (1976)
("Rape meant, by definition, rape of white women, for no such crime as rape of a
black woman existed at law. Even when a black man sexually attacked a black
woman he could only be punished by his master; no way existed to bring him to trial
or convict him is so brought.").
55. See WHITE, supra note 46, at 164-65.
56. Id. at 164 (citing DONALD J. MULVIHMLL, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, A STAFF REPORT
TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE
(1969)); see also id. at 149-62.
57. See WHITE, supra note 46, at 152-53.
58. See id.
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delicate, pure, submissive, calm, frail, small and dependent."5 9 The
slave woman, on the other hand, was restricted to the circumscribed
role of worker, breeder and temptress. While women in the ante-
bellum South were expected to conform to the mores of the time,
which demanded that their bodies be fully concealed from view,
slave women were forced to exist in various states of undress.
0
This situation facilitated the creation of the archetypal "Jezebel"
image. The Jezebel figure worked to enforce the stereotype of the
slave woman as a deviant, libidinal being.6 According to the dictates
of this image, the slave woman actively sought sexual advances
from White men. Any resistance on her part was regarded as only
for show and therefore not to be heeded. The supposed unlimited
sexual appetite of enslaved Black women was used by their captors
to rationalize rape and other brutal treatment.62 Thus the Jezebel
image was manipulated to justify not only the miscegenation, cruel-
59. Leith Mullings, Images, Ideology, and Women of Color, in WOMEN OF COLOR IN
U.S. SOCIETY 267 (Maxine Baca Zinn and Bonnie Thornton Dill eds., 1994).
60. See WHITE, supra note 46, at 31-34.
61. As Lerner discussed:
By assuming a different level of sexuality for all blacks than that of
whites and mythifying their greater sexual potency, the black woman
could be made to personify sexual freedom and abandon. A myth
was created that all black women were eager for sexual exploits, vol-
untarily 'loose' in their morals and therefore deserved none of the
consideration and respect granted white women. Every black woman
was, by definition, a slut according to this racist mythology; there-
fore, to assault her and exploit her sexually was not reprehensible
and carried with it none of the normal communal sanctions against
such behavior. A wide range of practices reinforced this myth: the
laws against intermarriage; the denial of the title 'Miss' or 'Mrs.' to
any black woman; the taboos against respectable social mixing of the
races; the refusal to let black women customers try on clothing in
stores before making a purchase; the assigning of single toilet facili-
ties to both sexes of blacks; the different legal sanction against rape,
abuse of minors and other sex crimes when committed against white
or black women.
LERNER, supra note 41, at 163-64; see also K. SUE JEWELL, FROM MAMMY TO MISS
AMERICA AND BEYOND: CULTURAL IMAGES AND THE SHAPING OF U.S. SOCIAL POLICY
36 & 46 (1993) (discussing the Jezebel stereotype and its application to black slave
women); WHITE, supra note 46, at 27-61. See generally Joan R. Tarpley, Blackwomen,
Sexual Myth, and Jurisprudence, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1343 (1996) (discussing the history of
the Jezebel myth and its continuing relation to American jurisprudence).
62. Jewell, supra note 61, at 211 ("[Sllave owners ... attributed these liaisons to
the hypersexuality of the female slave who was purported to be the aggressor or
seducer."); see also White, supra note 46, at 38 ("It was black women who, many
claimed, tempted men of the superior caste. White men, it was argued, never had to
use authority or violence to obtain compliance from bonded women because the
latter's morals were so relaxed.").
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ties and sexual abuse endured by slave women, but also to explain
the abundance of children of mixed racial heritage.
B. Reproductive Prisoners: "Breeder" Women
The Black woman in slavery was chattel. She existed as the
property of another human being, who was at liberty to do with her
as he/she wished.6 This was particularly true for child-bearing slave
women who were subject to a separate and distinct form of terror.
On the auction block, Black women's naked bodies were handled by
prospective buyers so that they might discern the woman's repro-
ductive capabilities." Buyers at slave auctions often "kneaded
women's stomachs in an attempt to determine how many children a
woman could have."' At one documented slave auction, the auc-
tioneer exclaimed to a slave woman waiting to be sold, "[sihow your
neck, Betsey. There's a breast for you; good for a round dozen before
she's done child-bearing."6 When there was doubt about a woman's
reproductive ability, she could be taken by her prospective pur-
63. As Lerner explained:
The plantation slave system formed a separate and distinct culture
which bound both master and slave in a complex and interdependent
relationship. Although the race prejudice of whites, which antedated
the institutionalization of slavery, shaped the system's form and
character, its object was not genocide. American slavery was above
all a labor system, designed to extract the maximum amount of profit
from unwilling and dependent subjects. In practice, the production
process and the objects of the system set some limits to its arbitrari-
ness and cruelty. Self-interest of the master in the preservation of his
property generally dictated the maintenance of minimum standards
designed for survival of the slave, but it was the barest survival un-
der the harshest conditions. On the other hand, the deeply ingrained
racism of American culture, which designated Blacks not only as en-
slaved people but as inherently inferior because of their race, tended
to worsen the conditions of American slaves as the system advanced
in time. The mutually reinforcing interplay of racism and economic
motivation made the slave system increasingly oppressive.
LERNER, supra note 41, at 5.
Major periodicals carried articles detailing optimal conditions under
which bonded women were known to reproduce, and the merits of a
particular 'breeder' were often the topic of parlor or dinner table
conversations. The fact that something so personal and private be-
came a matter of public discussion prompted one ex-slave to declare
that 'women wasn't nothing but cattle.'
WHITE, supra note 46, at 31.
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chaser and a physician to a private room where she would be in-
spected more thoroughly.67
. Pregnant slaves and slave mothers were not immune from the
daily abuses that the rest of their kin fell prey to. Pregnant and
nursing slave women could be whipped "so that blood and milk
flew mingled from their breasts."' More often, however, pregnant
slaves were "made to lie face down in a specially dug depression in
the ground" prior to being whipped so as to protect the fetus, little
more than a commodity or the master's potential asset.69 "Breeder"
women, as they were called, were often kept pregnant, bearing chil-
dren as frequently as every twelve months.' Some women were
given inducements by slave owners to produce children. One plan-
tation manual instructed that "women with six children alive at any
one time are allowed all Saturday to themselves.' Women were
seldom allowed to choose their mates, and, if not impregnated by
their captors, were often compelled to couple with other slaves.2
Those slave women incapable of having children were fre-
quently separated from their husbands and sold.73 Because a Black
woman's relative value was in her ability to reproduce, infertile
women were worth less than those who could propagate.74 In fact, so
many slave owners attempted to sell off infertile slaves through
deceit and misrepresentation that Southern judges and juries became
accustomed to dealing with such cases. Indeed, if a slave woman,
certified by the seller as being able to bear children, was sold, and it
67. See id.
68. JONES, supra note 42, at 20.
69. See id.
70. See LERNER, supra note 41, at 47-48 (an 87 year old former slave woman
explained the lot of the "breeder slave": "Wunner dese here womans was my Antie
en she say dat she skacely call to min' he e'r whoppin' her, 'case she was er breeder
woman en'brought in chillun ev'y twelve mont's jes lak a cow bringin' in a calf....
He orders she can't be put to no strain 'casen uv dat.").
71. WHITE, supra note 46, at 100.
72. See id. at 102 (telling the story of a young woman who objected to reproduc-
ing with a male slave. The master asserted that he paid "big money," explaining, "I
wants you to raise me childrens.").
73. According to a former slave, "[Ilf a woman was a good breeder, 'they was
proud of her;' if not, they got rid of her." Id.
74. For example:
In 1852 an Alabama master bought three women only to find out that
one of them had syphilis, another had gonorrhea, and the third suf-
fered from the effects of an umbilical hernia, all of which rendered




could be proven that the seller knew she was infertile, the sale
would be voided and the proceeds refunded. 75
The Black woman as slave in the colonial South was exploited
for her reproductive abilities as well as her physical labor.76 After
Congress outlawed the slave trade in 1801, slave women's reproduc-
tive capabilities became of paramount importance to the
slaveholding states. Consequently, the lot of Black women did not
improve until well into the twentieth century. Many Black women
were limited to the same role they served during slavery, when they
were systematically denied the rights to education, to vote, and to
maintain the integrity of their own bodies.7 In many respects, the
role of modern Black women can be said to have been defined by the
slavery experience since they continue to be bound by the insepara-
ble combination of oppressions based on gender, race and economic
status.78
75. See id.
76. See Nell I. Painter, Thinking About the Languages of Money and Race: A Response
to Michael O'Malley, "Specie and Species," 99 AM. HIST. REv. 396, 398 (1994) ("Enslaved
black people were not simply likened to money, they were a kind of money."). With
regard to the value of a slave woman of childbearing age, Painter discusses "the
literal value of sex in slavery, of women as sexual property, reproduction that has
cash value, and the enhancement of that value when the act that engenders it joins
men who were white with women who were black-sex that was bound to be co-
erced." Id.; see also JONES, supra note 42, at 14:
One North Carolina slave woman, the mother of fifteen children,
used to carry her youngest with her to the field each day, and "When
it get hungry she just slip it around in front and feed it and go right
on picking or hoeing..." symbolizing in one deft motion the equal
significance of her productive and reproductive function to her
owner.
77. With Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), 58 years of contrary
precedent set by Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896), were struck down, in-
cluding laws enforcing racial segregation in four states, including South Carolina, as
violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (states participating in the Medicaid program are not
obligated to fund medically necessary abortions); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 334 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965's ban on literacy tests,
and recounting how southern states enacted measures specifically designed to pre-
vent Blacks from voting and structured safeguards so Whites, even if illiterate, could
vote).
78. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (arguing that gender essentialism silences the experiences of
Black women); Roberts, supra note 19, at 1424 (noting that the prosecution of drug-
addicted Black mothers can be seen as punishment for an inseparable combination of
gender, race, and economic status); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitu-
tion: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 10-11
(1989) (discussing the legal system's difficulties in categorizing "black women" when
trying to protect the rights of "blacks" and "women").
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C. Contemporary Images: The Unfit Mother
The principal tenets of American slavery created some of the
most lasting negative cultural images and representations of Black
women. Archetypes such as the licentious Jezebel figure and the
passive Breeder Woman continue to shape the way we conceive of
Black maternity well into modem times. The influence of these ico-
nographic figures is particularly evident in the context of Black
women's reproductive autonomy.
With the abolition of slavery the ability of Black women to bear
children was no longer deemed a financial asset but a liability-a
drain upon the economy. Black motherhood became suspct.
Throughout this century, family planning initiatives aimed at Black
women were often little more than attempts to limit Black women's
reproductive capabilities.79 In fact, during the 1930's the federal gov-
ernment subsidized the first birth control clinics in order to lower
the Black birth rate and thereby control the Black population", Even
the nascent birth control movement, led by Margaret Sanger, openly
supported and promoted the use of birth control as a means of lim-
iting the reproductive freedoms of Black women.8'
In 1939, Sanger and her associates at the Birth Control Federa-
tion of America initiated the "Negro Project," established to regulate
the reproductive abilities of Black women thought to "still breed
carelessly and disastrously, with the result that the increase among
Negroes, even more than among whites, is from that portion of the
population least intelligent and fit, and least able to rear children
properly."82 Advocating abortion, contraception and eugenics or
compulsory sterilization for Black women, these birth control pio-
neers saw reproductive technology as a viable means of containing
the proliferation of "human weeds."8'
79. See Robert G. Weisbord, GENOCIDE? BIRTH CONTROL AND THE BLACK
AMERICAN (1975) (discussing the notion held by many Black people that family
planning programs could be used to commit race genocide); see also William A.
Darity, Family Planning, Race Consciousness and the Fear of Race Genocide, 62 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1454, 1454-56 (1972) (same).
80. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945,
1970-71 (1993).
81. See Linda Gordon, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 281-83, 332-33 (1976). In the American Birth Control
League's Journal, Sanger wrote, "More children from the fit, less from the unfit-that
is the chief issue of birth control." Id. at 281.
82. Id. at 332.
83. See Charlotte Rutherford, Reproductive Freedoms and African American Women,
4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255, 273 (1992); see also GEORGE GRANT, GRAND ILLUSIONS:




In 1965, Daniel P. Moynihan, currently U.S. Senator from New
York, "legitimized" the widely accepted depiction of the Black fam-
ily as dysfunctional, and the Black mother as pathological due to her
alleged inability to adhere to White middle-class social norms.4 This
image of the Black mother was used to justify programs and policies
aimed at restricting Black maternity. For example, during the 1960's,
in an attempt to discourage childbearing and reduce the number of
individuals on welfare, the federal government dramatically
increased funding for family planning clinics, placing a dispropor-
tionate number in Black and Latino communities.u
Throughout the 1970's, Black women were threatened with the
withdrawal of welfare benefits if they refused to agree to steriliza-
tion. During this period, twenty-five percent of indigent White
women were sterilized compared to thirty-four percent of indigent
Black women. In a suit brought by indigent teenage Black women,
a federal district court found that an estimated 100,000 to 150,000
poor women were sterilized each year under federally funded pro-
grams.8 Many physicians refused to deliver babies or perform
abortions on pregnant Black women unless they consented to sterili-
zation.89 In addition, during the 1970's and 1980's Public Assistance
84. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE
NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 29-34 (1965).
85. See Annette Dula, African American Suspicion of the Healthcare System is Justi-
fied: What Do We Do About It?, 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 347, 349-50
(1994) (showing that the clinics were placed with the intent to reduce minority
births).
86. See Roberts, supra note 80, at 1971.
87. See Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income
Women, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 15, 31 (1989). In addition, a 1982 study found that
not only were Black women of all marital statuses were more likely than White
women to use sterilization as a contraception method, but Black women in the South
had the highest rates of hysterectomy and tubal ligation in the United States. See id.
Thus, in response to the abuses of the 1970's, the Department of Health and Human
Services adopted regulations aimed at ensuring that informed consent be obtained
from all women who receive federally funded sterilizations. See 442 C.F.R.
§§ 441.250-.259 (1991) (sterilizations); 42 C.F.R. § 441.257 (1991) (informed consent);
42 C.F.R. § 441.258 (1991) (consent form requirements). However, the impact of those
regulations remains to be seen due to poor consent monitoring procedures and the
lack of publicly available data on the efficacy of the regulations. See Nsiah-Jefferson,
supra, at 30.
88. See Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974); see also Cox v.
Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) (reversing dismissal of a claim brought by a Black
woman who was permanently sterilized after she agreed to temporary sterilization
when threatened with termination of welfare benefits); Darci Elaine Burrell, The
Norplant Solution: Norplant and the Control of African American Motherhood, 5 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 401, 423 (1995) (discussing Relfv. Weinberger).
89. See Roberts, supra note 80, at 1971.
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officials duped Black welfare claimants into having their teenage
daughters sterilized. °
Modern reproductive technology continues to be used to foil
Black women's reproduction. Almost immediately after its December
10, 1990 approval by the United States Food and Drug Administra-
tion, proposals for the use of the contraceptive Norplant 9' were
aimed at controlling Black women's fertility.92 It was not long before
all fifty states had incorporated Norplant into their welfare systems,
providing either reimbursement for the cost of Norplant to women
receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children or a cash bonus
for those women who agreed to be implanted with the device.93 High
schools considered offering Norplant to teenage girls,94 and courts
and legislatures debated conditioning probation on the acceptance
of Norplant.95 Thus Norplant, like the proposals of the eugenicists at
the turn of the century and the coerced sterilization of poor Black
women during the 1970s and 1980s, was seen as a solution to the
"problem" of Black women having babies.
Today, a disproportionately high percentage of Black women
live below the poverty line.96 Black women are also five times more
90. See Dula, supra note 85, at 350.
91. See Burrell, supra note 88, at 402 ("Norplant consists of six, match-sized,
silicon tubes which release a steady stream of the synthetic hormone levnorgestill
into the bloodstream to prevent pregnancy. The tubes are surgically inserted under
the skin of a woman's arm and prevent conception for up to five years.") (citations
omitted).
92. See generally Burrell, supra note 88 (arguing that Norplant proposals aimed at
poor Black women were based on the notion that Black women are deviant and thus
less deserving of motherhood than White women).
93. See David S. Coale, Note, Norplant Bonuses and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 71 TEX. L. REv. 189, 189-90 (1992) (discussing state funded programs that
provide incentives for the use of Norplant); Dorothy E. Roberts, Norplant's Threat to
Civil Liberties and Racial Justice, N.J. L.J., July 26, 1993, at 20.
94. See, e.g., Tim Larimer, High School Offers Birth Control Implant, Blacks Disagree
on Merits of Program, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 17, 1993, at A37.
95. See Janet F. Ginzberg, Note, Compulsory Contraception as a Condition of Proba-
tion: The Use and Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 979, 979-80 (1992) (on January
2, 1991, a California judge ordered Darlene Johnson, a Black woman convicted of
child abuse, to receive Norplant as a condition of her probation). The Ohio legisla-
ture introduced a bill intended to expand the definition of child neglect to cover the
use of controlled substances during pregnancy and which would require women
twice convicted of this new crime to use Norplant. See Deborah Ann Bailey, Com-
ment, Maternal Substance Abuse: Does Ohio Have An Answer?, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV.
1019, 1032-33 (1992) (discussing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(A) (Page 1998);
§ 2919.221(B) (2) (Page 1996)).
96. In 1991, 9.8% of White men and 12.7% of White women lived in poverty,
while 26.2% of Hispanic men, 28.5% of Black men, 31.2% of Hispanic women, and
36.5% of Black women lived in poverty. See CHERYL RUSSELL & MARGARET AMBRY,
THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO AMERICAN INCOMES 283 (1993); see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P60-185,
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likely to be poor and on welfare, and are three times more likely to
be unemployed than White women.9 In addition, Black women are
paid less than White women and Black and White men.9' Poor Black
women often enjoy few options with regard to their medical care,
including choice of physicians and the hospitals they can attend.
This lack of viable choices has a direct impact on the health of Black
women and their children.9
Black women are 3.8 times more likely to die from pregnancy-
related causes than White women.'O° Almost one out of ten Black
infants is born to a mother who received late or no prenatal care,101
and among Black teenage mothers under the age of fifteen, that fig-
ure increases to two in ten. Moreover, Black women receiveprenatal care later in their pregnancies than White women, if they
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992, at 1 tbl. 1 (Number, Poverty Rate, and Stan-
dard Errors of Persons, Families, and Unrelated Individuals Below the Poverty Level:
1992 and 1991), 147 tbl. 23 (Poverty Threshold, By Size of Family and Number of
Related Children, 1992) (1993). Although two-thirds of poor Americans are White,
the poverty rate for Blacks is 33.3%, the highest in the nation, compared to the na-
tional poverty rate of 14.5%. In 1992, close to 40 million people were living under the
official federal poverty level, which was $9137 for a family of two, $11,186 for a
family of three and $14,335 for a family of four. See id.
97. See Roberts, supra note 19, at 1432 n.60 (citing NADJA ZALOKAR, U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN 1 (1990)).
98. In 1991 the median earnings of White men working full-time, year-round
was $30,266, while the median earnings of Black men, White women, and Black
women were $22,075, $20,794 and $18,720, respectively. See Russell & Ambry, supra
note 96, at 51-52; see also Scales-Trent, supra note 79, at 9 n.2 & 10 n.1 (noting that the
racial gap in unemployment rates plus the gender gap is not as great as the racial-
gender gap, suggesting that race and gender interact to magnify the effects of each
independently).
99. White Americans, on average, have a life expectancy that is 6.5 years longer
than that of Black Americans. See 6 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON BLACK AND MINORITY HEALTH 1 (1986)
[hereinafter SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE]. Although, proportionately, more White
women suffer from breast cancer, Black women are twice as likely to die from the
disease. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, CULTURE, & POLITICS 57 (1989). Likewise,
Black women are also significantly more likely to die from diabetes, hypertension, or
cardiovascular disease, and three times more likely to suffer from high blood pres-
sure or lupus than similarly situated White women. See id. at 58.
100. A recent state-by-state study of maternal mortality revealed "huge disparities
between black and white women" and found that the best rates for Black women
remained "higher or in about the same range as the worst rates for white women."
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Racial Divide Found in Maternal Mortality, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1999, at A24 (internal quotations omitted); see also DANA HUGHES, ET AL., CHILDREN'S
DEFENSE FUND, THE HEALTH OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN: MATERNAL AND CHILD
HEALTH DATA BOOK 10 (1989) (revealing data that Black women are far more likely
to die of pregnancy-related causes than White women).
101. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, BLACK AND WHITE CHILDREN IN AMERICA:
KEY FACTS 76 (1985).
102. See id.
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receive it at all. As a result, the children of Black women are twice
as likely to die during infancy.'04 Indeed, in 1992 the Black infant
mortality rate was 16.8 per thousand births compared to 6.9 for
Whites."8 In Washington, D.C., the mortality rate among Black
infants is triple that for the entire country. In addition, grossly
disproportionate to their 15% representation in the general popula-
tion, Black children comprise 39.0% to 42.4% of the children in the
foster care system.7
Yet the root causes of these seemingly intratable social ills are
difficult to remedy because, while there is a legal framework in
which to investigate issues relating to Blacks and a separate frame-
work for issues relating to women, we lack a legal paradigm to
analyze issues that concern Black women. Black women experience a
double oppression due to their status as "Black" and as "women;"
the two are not separable components of their identity. The crea-
tion of this destructive dichotomy is a direct byproduct of this
country's legacy of slavery.
The enduring image of the "deviant" Black mother remains
with us today: the current political and social climate relies upon
racist stereotypes and images to create a class of mothers regarded
as not only deserving of their difficult social and economic situation,
but also unfit to raise their own children. 8 The Policy embodies a
vivid manifestation of these negative historical representations of
Black maternity.
103. See id. at 75; see also Stolberg, supra note 100 (reporting that Black women are
less likely to have adequate prenatal care than White women).
104. See DAVIS, supra note 99, at 58.
105. See DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY 183 (1997).
106. See id. at 184.
107. See Annie Woodley Brown & Barbara Bailey-Etta, An Out-of-Home Care Sys-
tem in Crisis: Implications for African American Children in the Child Welfare System, 76
CHILD WELFARE 65, 74-75 (1997). According to Dorothy Roberts, "Black mothers'
bonds with their children have been marked by brutal disruption, beginning with the
slave auction where family members were sold to different masters and continuing
in the disproportionate state removal of Black children to foster care." Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Unrealized Power of Mother, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & LAW 141, 146 (1995).
108. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (arguing that "Black women are sometimes
excluded from feminist theory and antiracist policy discourse because both are
predicated on a discrete set of experiences that often does not accurately reflect the
intersection of race and gender.").
109. See Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 2013, 2018-25 (1994) (examining the recipients of Aid to Families with Depend-
ent Children and welfare programs).
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III. SINGLING OUT POOR BLACK WOMEN FOR PROSECUTION
Virtually every aspect of the Policy demonstrates that it oper-
ated solely to punish Black women for their substance addiction
during pregnancy, rather than to address the health problems atten-
dant to such circumstances. The decisions of the Policy creators to (i)
implement the Policy at the one hospital in the state that serves a
disproportionately high Black population, (ii) utilize subjective
identifying criteria, and (iii) target cocaine to the exclusion of all
substances that could affect maternal and fetal health all contributed
to inevitably skew the Policy to disproportionately impact Black
women. Moreover, the fact that the Policy violated MUSC's own
standards on informed consent and patient confidentiality
(recognized with regard to all other patients) belies any explanation
for the Policy's singular effects on Black women other than the Pol-
icy framers' specific intent to target indigent Black women for
punitive treatment.
A. The Policy Discriminated In the Scope of its Application and Effects
1. Only Patients at MUSC Were Targeted
MUSC was the only hospital with which the CPD maintained a
formal policy of arresting pregnant and postpartum women who
tested positive for cocaine, and the only hospital at which such ar-
rests were made."' Notwithstanding that the jurisdiction of the
Solicitor's Office includes two counties"' and that the CPD's juris-
diction spanned the entire Charleston area,n2 the Policy was
developed. for and implemented only at MUSC. MUSC is a public
hospital that provides most of the publicly-funded care for the
Charleston area, serving a predominantly Black and economically
disadvantaged population.
The Policy did not apply to nearby private hospitals,'
nor did any other public hospital employ such a
110. See JA, supra note 5, at 1327, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 7-8
(noting that arrests were not made at the private hospitals in the area nor at any
other public health clinic in the tri-county region).
111. See JA, supra note 5, at 1323, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 7
(noting that the Solicitor's office had jurisdiction throughout Berkeley and Charles-
ton counties).
112. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 7
113. Indeed, MUSC's general counsel stated that the Policy implementors were
given "probably more latitude" to test the new program at MUSC, a publicly funded
hospital, than they would have had at a private hospital. JA, supra note 5, at 867-68,
noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 8. One MUSC physician candidly ac-
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program."' In fact, MUSC was the only hospital within at least a 50
mile radius which provided obstetric care for indigent and Medicaid
sponsored patients.15 The population served by MUSC was dispro-
portionately Black (70%) compared to Charleston's population (30%
Black)."6 The patient population at other area hospitals was only
approximately one-third Black."7 Thus the Policy expressly exoner-
ated wealthier patients and "whiter" populations.
Despite the fact that there is no significant difference across race
and class lines in rates of controlled substance use,"8 all but one of
the women prosecuted under the Policy, from 1989 until 1994, were
low-income Black women who sought prenatal or other health care
knowledged that implementing the policy at a private hospital "would cause too
much trouble, too much of a problem." JA, supra note 5, at 1216-17, noted in Brief of
Appellants, supra note 3, at 8 n.7.
114. CPD Chief Greenberg admitted that MUSC was the only hospital with which
CPD had a formal policy to arrest pregnant women who tested positive for cocaine,
and was also the only hospital at which such arrests were made. See JA, supra note 5,
at 889-890, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 8. The difference between the
racial composition of the MUSC patients and the racial makeup of patients at other
Charleston area hospitals under the jurisdiction of the CPD and Solicitor's Office is
statistically significant. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985) (holding
that a disparity of 1.7 times the norm demonstrates disparate impact).
115. See Horger, supra note 29, at 530.
116. See JA, supra note 5, at 1184-85, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 4.
117. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 25. ("While the MUSC's patient
population was approximately two-thirds African American, the patient population
at other area hospitals was only approximately one-third African American, a differ-
ence of approximately 18 standard deviations.").
118. See Chasnoff, supra note 19, at 1204 (detailing the results of a study testing
drug use among pregnant women showing that neither socioeconomic grouping nor
a subject's race or ethnicity predicted a positive drug test); see also Daniel R. Neus-
piel, Racism and Perinatal Addiction, ETHNICITY & DISEASE, Winter/Spring 1996, at 47-
48 (looking at rates of drug use among different ethnic groups). According to a
survey conducted by the Southern Regional Project on Infant Mortality:
Newspaper reports in the 1980s sensationalized the use of crack co-
caine and created a new picture of the typical female addict: young,
poor, black, urban, on welfare, the mother of many children, and ad-
dicted to crack. In interviewing nearly 200 women for this study, a
very different picture of the typical chemically dependent woman
emerges. She is most likely white, divorced or never married, age 31,
a high school graduate, on public assistance, the mother of two or
three children, and addicted to alcohol and one other drug. It is clear
from the women we interviewed that substance abuse among women
is not a problem confined to those who are poor, black or urban, but
crosses racial, class, economic and geographic boundaries.
SHELLY GEHSHAN, SOUTHERN REGIONAL PROJECT ON INFANT MORTALITY, A STEP
TOWARD RECOVERY: IMPROVING ACCESS TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FOR
PREGNANT AND PARENTING WOMEN 21 (1993) [hereinafter SRPIM REPORT].
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from MUSC."9 According to one MUSC physician, the Policy was
only applied to infants born in her unit, not to babies born at private
hospitals and subsequently transferred to her unit, nor was there a
policy to test such infants.'20 Additionally, a counselor from the
Charleston County Substance Abuse Commission explained that
under the Policy only patients from MUSC's high-risk ob/gyn
department were referred to her office for drug treatment. 12 Instead
of being offered treatment for their substance dependency, these
women were arrested when hospital personnel reported their status
to the CPD.12'
When the Policy was implemented, the racial composition of
women who tested positive for both legal and illegal drugs mirrored
the makeup of the maternity ward population at MUSC: 68% Black
and 32% White.123 Thus, from October 1, 1988 until September 30,
1989, the percentage of Black versus White maternity patients who
tested positive for drugs mirrored the percentage of Black and White
patients within the entire maternity population,24 confirming the
assumption that both Black and White maternity patients at MUSC
would use potentially harmful substances at approximately the
same rate."5 However, the racial composition of MUSC maternity
patients who tested positive for cocaine was markedly different.
Ninety percent (120 out of 133) of the total number of women who
tested positive for cocaine were Black, while only 10% (13 of 133
women) were White.
26
119. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 23-25. The chance of arresting 30
Black women consecutively is 1 in 165,103, corresponding to approximately five
standard deviations from the expected level, and the probability of this occurring
accidentally or by chance is 0.000006. See id. at 24.
120. See JA, supra note 5, at 1226, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 8.
121. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 9.
122. The only White woman prosecuted under the Policy was the mother of a
child fathered by a Black man. One of the Policy implementers, in fact, specifically
noted on the woman's medical records that she had a "Negro boyfriend." See Brief of
Appellants, supra note 3, at 23.
123. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 25.
124. See id. at 27. After implementation of the Policy and the new subjective
criteria for testing, the proportion rose considerably, by an amount equal to ap-
proximately 10.5 standard deviations. See JA, supra note 5, at 1344-46, noted in Brief
of Appellants, supra note 3, at 27.
125. In Pinellas County, Florida, despite the fact that drug use is equally prevalent
in both Black and White women, Black women were 9.58 times more likely to be
reported for substance abuse than White women. See Chasnoff, Discrepancies in
Mandatory Reporting, supra note 19, at 1205.
126. See JA, supra note 5, at 1338-39, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at
25. These percentages were calculated using the binomial distribution method.
According to this system, the difference is 5.44 standard deviations from the norm
and is thus statistically significant. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 25-26. The
possibility of such a stark differential occurring accidentally is between 1 in 100,000
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Despite the demographic breakdown of clinic patients at
MUSC, nearly all those reported pursuant to the policy and arrested
were Black.12 The striking disparity between Black women and
White women arrested and prosecuted under the policy suggests
that the Black women singled out under the Policy were denied
equal protection under the law.
121
2. The Policy Lacked a Scientific Basis
The clearly foreseeable disparate impact of MUSC's policy was
compounded by the fact that it rested on an unstable basis. Accord-
ing to the protocol, urine drug screens were performed on patients
who met certain criteria, including, inter alia: no prenatal care, late
prenatal care, incomplete prenatal care, intrauterine fetal death,
preterm labor, intrauterine growth retardation, and previous drug
use.129 This was the first step towards arrest under the Policy, not-
withstanding the fact that these criteria did not indicate the use of
cocaine or any other controlled substance" 3'
Before long, the Policy required neonatologists to test the in-
fants of mothers who met the criteria. Despite the Policy
implementers' assertions to the contrary, the Medical Director of the
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit explained that they did not test the
infants for medical reasons, as had previously been the case.131 After
the adoption of the Policy, MUSC personnel were required to main-
tain a formal "chain of custody" for the urine specimens collected
pursuant to the Policy, although this was not done with urine sam-
ples taken for purely medical reasons 32 Prior to October 1989,
and 1 in 1,000,000. See JA, supra note 5, at 1341-42, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra
note 3, at 26.
127. See Richard Green Jr., MUSC Won't Report Cocaine Use, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Sept. 7, 1994, at 1 (reporting that most women arrested pursuant
to the policy were Black); Gina Kolata, Racial Bias Seen Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1990, at A13 (reporting that of the estimated sixty known prosecutions
for prenatal drug exposure nationwide, 80% were brought against non-White
women).
128. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-09 (1985) (selective enforcement
of criminal statutes violates equal protection); see also Dorothy Roberts, supra note 19,
at 1425 (arguing that the prosecution of substance-addicted Black women who de-
cide to carry their pregnancies to term is unconstitutional).
129. See JA, supra note 5, at 1415; Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 7.
130. See JA, supra note 5, at 731-33 (according to Dr. Ira Chasnoff, it would be
"medically senseless" to consider MUSC's criteria indicative of cocaine use).
131. See JA, supra note 5, at 1225, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 7
(noting that prior to the Policy, infants were tested for medical reasons, but after the
Policy was adopted, infants were selected for testing based solely on the Policy
criteria).
132. See JA, supra note 5, at 1416, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 7.
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MUSC personnel reported the use of various different drugs, in-
cluding alcohol, to the Department of Social Services ("DSS")."
3. The Policy Only Applied to Cocaine Use
A study of South Carolina women who had just given birth re-
vealed that 5% of the womens' urine tested positive for either
alcohol, cocaine, marijuana or other illicit drugs; 2.5% tested positive
for marijuana; 1.9% tested positive for alcohol; and a mere 0.79%
tested positive for cocaine." Thus for every 100,000 births in South
Carolina in 1990, approximately 2974 infants were exposed to barbi-
turates, 1000 infants were exposed to marijuana, opiates and alcohol,
yet only 422 infants were exposed to cocaine.35 However, pursuant
to the Policy, only the prenatal ingestion of cocaine would lead to
arrest and incarceration."
MUSC and the solicitors purportedly chose to criminalize only
prenatal cocaine-dependency in order to prevent fetal harm from
exposure to this drug. This was so despite the fact that many other
legal and illegal substances ingested by a pregnant woman could
harm a fetus as much as cocaine, if not more so. 37 Moreover, because
the cheapest and most accessible form of cocaine, commonly re-
ferred to as crack, tends to be concentrated in urban and Black
communities, the decision to test only cocaine-addicted patients
was, in reality, a thinly veiled attempt to target Black women. 1
133. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 9.
134. See STATE COUNCIL ON MATERNAL, INFANT AND CHILD HEALTH, OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNOR, 1991 SOUTH CAROLINA PREVALENCE STUDY OF DRUG USE AMONG
WOMEN GIVING BIRTH 19 (1991) [hereinafter MICH PREVALENCE STUDY].
135. See id. at 31.
136. See JA, supra note 5, at 768, 1263-64; Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 10.
137. Studies have indicated that prenatal cocaine exposure can contribute to low
birthweight and prematurity, conditions that under the Policy lead to drug screens.
See SRPIM REPORT, supra note 118, at 5. However, many physiological, environ-
mental, and behavioral factors can also lead to these conditions including: pre-
eclampsia, diabetes, hypertension, lead exposure, cigarette smoking, poor nutrition,
alcohol consumption, and lack of prenatal care. See COMMITEE TO STUDY THE
PREVENTION OF Low BIRTHWEIGHT, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PREVENTING Low
BIRTHWEIGHT 1-7 (1985) [hereinafter COMMITrEE ON Low BIRTHWEIGHT].
138. According to Professor Dorothy Roberts:
Although different forms of substance abuse prevail among pregnant
women of various socioeconomic level and racial and ethnic back-
grounds, inner-city Black communities have the highest concentrations
of crack addicts. Therefore, selecting crack abuse as the primary fetal
harm to be punished has a discriminatory impact that cannot be
medically justified.
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The few early studies that triggered public alarm over the
effects of cocaine use during pregnancy were seriously flawed and
have since been contradicted and discredited.'39 Recent medical and
scientific studies have revealed significant methodological errors in
these previous reports, including the lack of control groups, the
failure to follow the subsequent health of newborns, the failure to
isolate the effects of cocaine use from those associated with the use
of other drugs, and the exclusive reliance on case reports.4 ° In fact,
contrary to the few misleading early reports, broad-based studies
have found no detectable increase in the rate or severity of birth
141defects associated with in utero cocaine exposure.
Roberts, supra note 19, at 1435. Moreover, while White women are more than twice
as likely to use marijuana than Black women, Black women are nearly six times as
likely to use crack cocaine. See MICH PREVALENCE STUDY, supra note 134, at 7. See
generally Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and
the Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737 (1991) (discussing the
broad prosecutorial discretion, under the claim of "war on drugs," that is biased
along gender, race and class characteristics, and offering possible reform to rectify
the disparate impact).
139. As the Harvard Mental Health Journal noted:
Much of the early alarming research turned out to be seriously
flawed. Evidence of the mothers' cocaine use (especially their own
reports) were often unreliable, and the studies were not always con-
trolled carefully. Testing for cocaine was not random, and often
women were chosen for testing precisely because they seemed to be
in need of help. Researchers had often neglected effects of poor nu-
trition and prenatal care, venereal disease, other drugs (especially
alcohol, heroin, and tobacco), and above all, child neglect and abuse.
It became apparent that journals had often been rejecting studies that
contradicted the dominant view. A 1991 combined analysis of 20
studies on cocaine and pregnancy found few effects that could be
specifically attributed to cocaine.
Update on Cocaine-Part 1, 10 HARv. MENTAL HEALTH J. 1, 3 (1993).
140. For further information examining the fact that early studies were not sup-
ported by later ones, see, e.g., PHILLIP 0. COFFIN, THE LINDESMITH CENTER, COCAINE
& PREGNANCY (1997). In an article in the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion, a team of research physicians condemned the inaccurate conclusions being
drawn about the impact of maternal cocaine consumption on fetuses. Their meticu-
lous and comprehensive review of the scientific data found that "available" evidence
from the newborn period is far too slim and fragmented to allow any clear predic-
tions about the effects of intrauterine exposure to cocaine on the course and outcome
of child growth and development. See Linda Mayer, et al., The Problem of Prenatal
Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to Judgment, 267 JAMA 406 (1992). In addition, the Center
for Health Policy Research at George Washington University in a two-year study,
"found a consensus among researchers that the negative consequences of in utero
cocaine exposure were both temporary and treatable." GEORGE WASHINGTON
CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, AN ANALYSIS OF RESOURCES TO AID DRUG-
EXPOSED INFANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES (1993).
141. See Daniel R. Neuspiel, Cocaine-Associated Abnormalities May Not Be Causally
Related, 146 AM. J. OF DISEASES OF CHILDREN 278 (1992); see also C.D. Coles, Saying
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Further, carefully-controlled studies have found minimal or no
increase in Sudden Infant Death Syndrome among infants prenatally
exposed to cocaine 42 and studies of chronic cocaine use among hu-
man and animal subjects have revealed "no direct effects on the
health or development of newborns."'' Most importantly, those
medical professionals who work with cocaine-exposed children
maintain that they are "indistinguishable from other children."'" It
"Goodbye" to the "Crack Baby": Cocaine and the Fetus: Mythology of Severe Risk, 15
NEUROTOXICOLOGY AND TERATOLOGY 290 (1993) ("The hysteria and poorly consid-
ered reactions of both professionals and public have made the 'crack baby' for years
an embarrassing episode."); Daniel R. Neuspiel, Cocaine and the Fetus: Mythology of
Severe Risk, 15 NEUROTOXICOLOGY AND TERATOLOGY 305 (1993) (noting that the
"mythology of severe risk" of gestational cocaine persists even though studies refute
it). While some researchers have found an increase in genitourinary tract malforma-
tions and decreases in birth weights, body lengths, and head circumferences of
cocaine-exposed neonates, they also note that the pregnant cocaine users studied
have a clustering of other reproductive risk factors-notably, elevated tobacco and
alcohol use and lack of prenatal care-that "confound" conclusions about cocaine
toxicity. Researchers also observed that even problematic findings do not appear
predictive of longer-term physiological, behavioral or cognitive deficits. See Jos et al.,
supra note 17, at 17.
142. See Coffin, supra note 140, at 21 (citing Howard Bauchner et al., Risk of Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome Among Infants with in Utero Exposure to Cocaine, 113 J.
PEDIATRICS 831-34 (1988)).
143. Id.; see also Ira J. Chasnoff, Drug Use and Women: Establishing A Standard of
Care, 562 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF Sci., 208-10 (1989), cited in Horger, supra
note 29, at 527-31. In 1996, the Brown University School of Medicine studied the 1
and 2-day old infants of 57 women, 20 of whom smoked crack during pregnancy.
The study revealed that while babies exposed to cocaine in utero were tense and
jittery after hearing the sound of a rattle or bell, or alternatively lethargic and indif-
ferent, there was no evidence that prenatal cocaine exposure cause hemorrhages,
lesions, or other physical damage to infants' brains. See Christopher S. Wren, For
Crack Babies, a Future Less Bleak, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1998, at D4.
Moreover, Dr. Daniel R. Neuspiel, currently a pediatrician at Beth Israel Medi-
cal Center in New York, tracked 250 cocaine exposed infants for three to six years
and found that although the newborns were irritable, had trouble eating and sleep-
ing, and experienced an increased heart rate, these symptoms wore off after 72
hours. See id. He noted that his only consistent findings were in the growth of such
infants, as they experienced reduced birth weight due to premature labor, and
smaller head circumference. He concluded, however, that he had not observed any
persistent problems related to prenatal cocaine exposure. See id.
144. See Dana Kennedy, Experts: Children Born Addicted to Crack Rise Above Dire
Predictions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5, 1992, available in 1992 WL 5328389; see also
Hallam Hurt et al., Children With In Utero Cocaine Exposure Do Not Differ from Control
Subjects on Intelligence Testing, 151 ARCHIVEs PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 1237
(1997) (finding that IQ scores did not differ between cocaine-exposed and non-
cocaine-exposed children); Donald E. Hutchings, The Puzzle of Cocaine's Effects Fol-
lowing Maternal Use During Pregnancy: Are There Reconcilable Differences?, 15
NEUROTOXICOLOGY AND TERATOLOGY 281, 285 (1993) (finding that the growth and
neurobehavioral effects attributable primarily to cocaine alone and not other sub-
stances of abuse appear to be only marginal and transitory); Gideon Koren,
Commentary, Cocaine and the Human Fetus: The Concept of Teratophilia, 15 NEU-
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comes then, as no surprise, that today even those same researchers
responsible for igniting the political and media frenzy over "crack
babies" maintain that the policies developed in response to the con-
cern they manufactured have been more detrimental to infants and
children than prenatal cocaine use.
Nevertheless, during the 1980's, tales of an ensuing onslaught
of "crack babies" flooding urban hospitals were rampant and af-
fected public as well as political and legal attitudes towards
substance-dependency.'5 The misperceptions surrounding prenatal
substance-addiction were so widespread that child welfare agencies
across the nation had, and continue to have, difficulty locating
homes for healthy children who were pejoratively labeled "crack
babies."'4 Although physicians and medical researchers ultimately
concluded that fears about the effects of prenatal cocaine use were
vastly overblown, they were unable to effectively stem the tide of
misinformation and alarm.
4 7
The Policy implementers' identification of cocaine addiction as
posing the most significant risk to fetal health is further belied by the
wealth of scientific evidence showing that lack of prenatal care' and
ROTOXICOLOGY AND TERATOLOGY 301, 303 (1993) (concluding that children of both
social cocaine users and addictive cocaine users are likely to be normal both mor-
phologically and neurodevelopmentally).
145. See Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, The Crack Attack: Politics and Media
in American's Latest Drug Scare, in IMAGES OF ISSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 115 (Joel Best ed., 1989) (discussing the media's incentive to pro-
duce dramatic stories of the drug epidemic and politicians' use of these colorful
exaggerations to motivate voters).
146. See Daniel R. Neuspiel, Letter, Infant 'Abandonment' by Drug Using Mothers:
Blaming the Victims?, 148 ARcHIVES OF PEDIATRIC AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 437-
438 (1994); Daniel R. Neuspiel et al., Custody of Cocaine-Exposed Newborns: Determi-
nants of Discharge Decisions, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 1726, 1726-29 (1993); J.C. Barden,
Foster Care System Reeling Despite Law Meant to Help, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, at Al
(showing the statistical growth of children placed in the foster care system and the
declining pool of willing adoptive parents); Sandra Blakeslee, Child-Rearing is Stormy
When Drugs Cloud Birth, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1990, at Al (discussing the hardships
encountered by adoptive parents in addition to difficulty finding doctors and baby
sitters).
147. See Linda C. Mayes et al., The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to
Judgment, 267 JAMA 406 (1992).
148. As Coffin noted, "The lack of quality prenatal care services is associated with
prematurity, low birth weight, and other fetal developmental problems. Provision of
quality prenatal care to heavy cocaine users (with or without drug treatment) has
been shown to significantly improve fetal health and development." Coffin, supra
note 140, at 2 (citing Luella Klein & Robert L. Goldenberg, Prenatal Care and its Effect
on Preterm Birth and Low Birth Weight, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRENATAL CARE 501,
525 (Irwin R. Merkatz & Joyce E. Thompson eds. 1990) (finding prenatal care plays
an important role in reducing preterm birth and low birth weight)); see also Cynthia
Chazotte et al., Cocaine Use During Pregnancy and Low Birth Weight: The Impact of
Prenatal Care and Drug Treatment, 19 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY 293, 293-94 (1995)
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the use of tobacco and alcohol1l ° are the most significant causes of
developmental problems in newborns. When compared to the pri-
mary causes of birth defects, including environmental agents (10-
15%),'"l heredity (10_15%),1s2 and those attributable to unknown
factors,53 chemical exposure accounts for only a tiny percentage of
all birth defects (1-5%).'m Yet, despite the greater threat posed by
(finding a lower rate of low birth weight among cocaine-using women who received
prenatal care compared with those who did not receive prenatal care); Scott N.
MacGregor et al., Cocaine Abuse During Pregnancy: Correlation Between Prenatal Care
and Perinatal Outcome, 74 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 882, 885 (1989) (concluding
that comprehensive prenatal care may improve the outcome in pregnancies compli-
cated by cocaine abuse, but prenatal morbidity associated with cocaine abuse cannot
be eliminated by improved prenatal care).
149. See Coffin, supra note 140, at 2 ("Tobacco use is associated with low birth
weight, prematurity, growth retardation, SIDS, cognitive, achievement, and behav-
ioral problems, and, in rare cases, mental retardation.") (citations omitted). A study
conducted by Drs. DiFranza and Lew found that
[e]ach year, use of tobacco products is responsible for an estimated
19,000 to 141,000 tobacco-induced abortions, 32,000 to 61,000 infants
born with low birthweight, and 14,000 to 26,000 infants who require
admission to neonatal intensive care units. Tobacco use is also annu-
ally responsible for an estimated 1900 to 4800 infant deaths resulting
from perinatal disorders, and 1200 to 2200 deaths from sudden infant
death syndrome (SIDS).
Joseph R. DiFranza & Robert A. Lew, Effect of Maternal Cigarette Smoking on Pregnancy
Complications and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 40 J. FAMILY PRACTICE 385, 385
(1995). Researchers have found that the fetal effects of paternal and maternal ciga-
rette smoking are strikingly similar to those of prenatal cocaine exposure. See
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, AN ANALYSIS OF
RESOURCES To AID DRUG-EXPOSED INFANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 3 (1993) (citing J.J.
Volpe, Mechanisms of Disease: Effects of Codeine Use on the Fetus, 327 NEW ENGL. J.
MED. 399 (1992)); K.C. Schoendorf & J.L. Kiely, Relationship of Sudden Infant Death
Syndrome to Maternal Smoking During and After Pregnancy, 90 PEDIATRICS 905 (1992);
D.L. Davis, Paternal Smoking and Fetal Health, 337 LANCET 123 (1991). Notwithstand-
ing these facts, there have been no reported attempts to arrest or prosecute cigarette
smoking parents for prenatal harm.
150. See Coffin, supra note 140, at 2 ("Abuse of alcohol, more than any recreational
drug, causes the greatest number of and most severe birth defects: 0.19% of all new-
borns (about 7600, or 1% of all newborns exposed to alcohol) are diagnosed with
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, and a larger number experience 'fetal alcohol effects.' "). It
is estimated that 1 in 600 infants are born every year with permanently debilitating
conditions related to fetal alcohol syndrome. In fact, fetal alcohol syndrome is the
leading known cause of mental retardation. See Roberts, supra note 105, at 177.
151. See Coffin, supra note 140, at 2 (citing Donald E. Hutchings, Prenatal Opioid
Exposure and the Problem of Causal Inference, in CURRENT RESEARCH ON THE CON-
SEQUENCES OF MATERNAL DRUG ABUSE 6, 17 (1985)).
152. See id.
153. See Nora S. Gustavsson, Drug Exposed Infants and Their Mothers: Facts, Myths
and Needs, 16 SOC. WORK HEALTH CARE, 87, 96 (1992).
154. See Coffin, supra note 140, at 2.
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other behavior and characteristics, MUSC continued its preexisting
policies with respect to all factors except cocaine.
Prior to October 1989, MUSC personnel reported to DSS the use
by pregnant women of many different drugs, including alcohol.155
MUSC staff had also previously used civil commitment proceedings
instead of criminal incarceration for alcoholic patients or those ad-
dicted to drugs such as cocaine."' While MUSC continued this practice
for women whom it found were addicted to alcohol or other illegal
substances, after the Policy was adopted cocaine addicts were re-
ported to law enforcement officials and arrested.
5 7
Many activities, both legal and illegal, can detrimentally affect fe-
tal health and development. Exposure to environmental factors such
as inadequate nutrition or sexually transmitted diseases, exposure to
occupational hazards, substandard housing, and lack of social sup-
ports and services can have profound negative affects on infant
health.5 1 Other potential hazards include physical and psychosocial
stress which may contribute to low birth weight. In addition, medical
risks predating pregnancy such as diabetes and chronic hypertension,
and medical risks during pregnancy such as carrying multiple fetuses
and even being pregnant while under the age of seventeen or over the
age of thirty-four, can have adverse effects on a fetus.5 Indeed, "even
large doses of aspirin may delay the onset of labor and cause prema-
ture closure of the fetal ductus arteriosus... or neonatal bleeding."16
If the idea behind the Policy was followed to its logical conclusion,
then any pregnant woman who drinks alcohol could be arrested for
child abuse because of the risk of fetal alcohol syndrome. Similarly, a
pregnant woman could be arrested for failing to take proper
155. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 9.
156. See JA, supra note 5, at 1150-52, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at
29-30.
157. See JA, supra note 5, at 768, 1224, 1319-20, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra
note 3, at 30.
158. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Lindesmith Center and Women's Law Project,
Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1857
(1998), reprinted in 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 139, 146-47 (1998) [hereinafter
Lindesmith Center Amicus Brief] (citing N.S. Gustavson & A.E. Mac Eachron, Crimi-
nalizing Women's Behavior, 27 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 673, 675-76 (1997)); see also
COMMrITEE ON Low BIRTHWEIGHT, supra note 137, at 1-7.
159. See Lindesmith Center Amicus Brief, supra note 158, at 145-47.
160. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY § 18, ch. 249 (Mark H.
Beers & Robert Berkow eds., 17th ed. 1999), quoted in Lindesmith Center Amicus Brief,
supra note 158, at 146. Many commonly prescribed medications, such as anticonvul-
sants, lithium, and other mood stabilizers, antipsychotics, and benzodiazepines (class
of medications which includes Valium, Librium and Xanax), some antibacterials
(especially Tetracyclines), anticoagulants, thyroid medications, and antihypertensive




medication, or failing to follow her doctor's orders. Failing to refrain
from rigorous sports during pregnancy could likewise lead to criminal
sanctions. Moreover, a woman could be prosecuted. for potentially
damaging her fetus by smoking cigarettes during pregnancy. Thus, by
necessary implication, prenatal exposure to any substance, activity or
factor demonstrated to have a detrimental affect would constitute
child abuse. 6'
B. The Policy Evinced Discriminatory Intent To Target Poor Black Women
From October 1989 to January 1990, those women who tested
positive for cocaine at the time they gave birth were not afforded the
opportunity to receive treatment for substance-dependency, but were
arrested immediately based on the single drug test.16 Even those
women who sought prenatal care prior to labor and delivery at MUSC
were not given the opportunity to receive treatment. Instead, many of
these women were simply arrested.' 63 Pursuant to the Policy, de-
pending on the stage in the pregnancy when cocaine use was
discovered, women who tested positive could be arrested or threat-
ened with arrest for crimes such as possession of drugs, child neglect,
or distribution of drugs to a person under the age of eighteen. The
161. See Tolliver v. South Carolina, 90-CP-23-5178 (Cir. Ct., Manning County, S.C.
1992); see also Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 335, 359 (Ill. 1988) ("Since anything
which a pregnant women does or does not do may have an impact, either positive or
negative, on her developing fetus, any act or omission on her part could render her
[criminally] liable to her subsequently born child.").
162. See JA, supra note 5, at 325, 348-49, 590-93, 1267, 1427, noted in Brief of Ap-
pellants, supra note 3, at 17.
163. The women who tested positive for drug use received no referral for drug
treatment nor an opportunity to seek treatment as an alternative to arrest. Indeed,
one woman arrested under the Policy repeatedly requested help in obtaining drug
treatment. See JA, supra note 5, at 1843-44; Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 17. At
trial, this woman explained, "I asked, please, what could I do to stop this or could
you help me, I mean, because, you know, what is going on. And then [the Nurse] just
said you will be locked up." JA, supra note 5, at 325, quoted in Brief of Appellants,
supra note 3, at 17-18.
164. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 16. The women targeted could be
charged with unlawful conduct towards a child, a felony carrying a maximum sen-
tence of ten years. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (West Supp. 1998). If it was a
woman's first offense, she could be charged with possession of cocaine, a misde-
meanor carrying a maximum two year sentence. See id. § 44-53-370(c) (1) (West Supp.
1998). Cocaine is listed as a Schedule II drug in South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-53-210(b) (4) (Law Co-op 1985), which means that she could also be charged
with distribution of crack cocaine to a person under age eighteen and would then
face a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440
(Law Co-op 1985 & West Supp. 1998).
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Policy was applied to all phases of pregnancy, both before and after
fetal viability."
Close examination of many aspects of the Policy's implementa-
tion reveals that it was intended to foscus exclusively on indigent
Black women. For instance, the application and enforcement of the
Policy deviated from MUSC's standard medical practice with regard
to consent to drug searches and patient confidentiality in medical
matters. MUSC personnel, including a manage who openly es-
poused racist beliefs, maintained substantial discretion over the
testing and reporting of women. Further, for reasons of political
expediency, the solicitors largely responsible for the Polcy's creation
chose to test and target women they considered essentially power-
less.
1. MUSC Personnel
MUSC staff were afforded an unusually wide degree of discre-
tion in applying the Policy and were integral to facilitating the
arrests. Throughout the period the Policy was enforced, MUSC
health care workers would call the CPD, file complaints, inform the
police that a patient who had tested positive was about to leave the
hospital, and help the CPD coordinate the patient's in-hospital ar-
rest.'66 Without doubt, granting unfettered discretion to health care
workers in deciding whom to test merely facilitated the Policy's
racially disparate effects.
Actions taken by the Nurse, a White woman who was in large
part responsible for the creation of the Policy, suggest that she har-
bored blatantly racist beliefs.1 67 Described as the Policy "point
person," the Nurse openly maintained that the problems of cocaine
abuse and addiction were unique to the Black community and
pushed for adoption of the Policy to address "an epidemic among
pregnant black women."' Other workers testified that the Nurse
frequently expressed her view that Black patients, to the exclusion of
all others, should be sterilized, and she testified in court that she
thought that "mixing of the races is against God's way."'69 Indeed, if
she learned that the father of a White patient's baby was Black, she
165. See JA, supra note 5, at 1425, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 16-
17.
166. See JA, supra note 5, at 1269-70, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at
17-18. Although she did not occupy a management position, the Nurse not only
dictated which patients were to be tested, but performed tasks on behalf of the So-
licitor's Office. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 29.
167. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 30-31.
168. JA, supra note 5, at 1396, quoted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 31.
169. Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 31.
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routinely noted this fact on the patient's medical record,'70 even
though the race of the infant's father was irrelevant to the informa-
tion needed by medical personnel. 7' The Nurse enjoyed a wide
range of powers, as the ability to identify, test and distinguish par-
ticular women to the authorities rested within her direct control.
2. The Charleston Solicitors
The Charleston solicitors' response to the grossly exaggerated
reports of the effects of cocaine on fetuses did not reflect recent
medical developments, but were instead based on popular notions
of "crack babies" and "bad mothers"-stereotypes which provided
substantial political currency. While the original Policy was publicly
endorsed by both candidates in the 1994 race for attorney general in
South Carolina, the solicitor who was most closely identified with
the Policy and was influential in its creation and implementation
was ultimately elected by a wide margin.'2
The representative from the Solicitor's Office, as Policy framers,
interjected their primarily White, affluent, male norms into the Pol-
icy's creation using their vast latitude in implementing the Policy to
target those most different from themselves. While the solicitors
maintained unbridled and substantially unreviewable discretion to
prosecute all, any or no substance-dependent women, they singled
out Black women for their "choice" to use drugs while pregnant.
Distorting legislative intent by expanding the coverage of South
Carolina's general child abuse and neglect statutes to cover Black
women who became pregnant while substance-addicted,' 73 the
170. See JA, supra note 5, at 722-24, 1460, 1488, 1489, 1491, noted in Brief of Ap-
pellants, supra note 3, at 31. On one patient's medical records, the Nurse wrote, "Pt.
Lives with her boyfriend who is a Negro." For another, she wrote, "Pt. States that FoB
is black." In still another she wrote, "Boyfriend black," double underlining "black."
Id.
171. See JA, supra note 5, at 722-24; Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 31.
172. See Jos et al., supra note 17, at 126.
173. Circuit Court Judge Thomas W. Cooper observed that:
When the legislature has meant fetus, it has used the word "fetus" to
the exclusion of the word "child." See, e.g., Code of Laws § 44-41-10(f)
(defining pregnancy as "the condition of a woman carrying a fetus or
embryo with in her body as the result of conception.") and (1)
(defining viability as "that stage of human development when the
fetus is potentially able to live outside of the mother's womb with or
without the aid of artificial life support systems."). Thus, the legisla-
ture has clearly used fetus when it meant fetus. This court can only
conclude that the legislature consciously chose to use the word
"child" in § 20-7-60 to the exclusion of the word "fetus."
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solicitors went after those individuals who wielded the least power
and influence in society-those who represented an affront to mid-
dle-class moral standards.
By criminalizing the addiction status of substance-dependent,
pregnant, Black women, the creators of the Policy relied on the fact
that Americans have been socialized to accept the notion that a por-
tion of the population is less valuable and less worthy of public
concern and therefore more deserving of punishment. 74 By conflat-
ing issues of race, crime, class and gender, the solicitors were
effectively able to exploit the internalized racism and misogyny that
permeates the American collective consciousness, 175 and thereby
evoke both the Jezebel and Breeder Woman archetypes-the wan-
ton, depraved Black temptress with the uncontrollable libido, and
the Black mother irresponsibly and selfishly bearing children. Util-
izing these politically potent symbols laden with negative historical
and culturally specific meaning, the solicitors were able to garner
and maintain support for the Policy. One of the two solicitors re-
sponsible for the development and implementation of the Policy
candidly explained, "[tihere's not enough political will to move after
pregnant women who use alcohol or cigarettes. There is, though, a
political basis for this Interagency Program."' 76
Tolliver v. South Carolina, 90-CP-23-5178 (Cir. Ct., Manning County, S.C. 1992); see
also Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (arguing that unconscious and unintended racism
is ignored in the intent requirement of the Equal Protection Clause).
174. In response to the suggestion that more be done to help these women and
their children, one solicitor cried: "These women want day care and free transporta-
tion, but who's taking care of their kids when they're on coke?" He further accused
the women of "blam[ing] society," rather than assuming their personal responsibility
for their problems. Jos et al., supra note 17, at 126.
175. While the blatantly racist beliefs that supported the institutions of slavery
and Jim Crow are much less prevalent today, American society remains infected
with a less obvious but in many ways more insidious "laissez-faire" racism. See
Lawrence D. Bobo, The Color Line, the Dilemma, and the Dream: Race Relations in Amer-
ica at the Close of the Twentieth Century, in CVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WRONGS: BLACK-
WHITE RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II 31, 38 (J. Higham ed., 1997). According to a
1990 study of racial attitudes, White people identified Blacks as more likely than
themselves to be unpatriotic, prone to violence, unintelligent, and lazy, preferring to
receive welfare benefits rather than work. See id. at 38-40. These pervasive, often
unconscious, yet deeply held beliefs form the basis for broad support among White
Americans of measures that have a disparate negative impact on Black people. Some
examples of this phenomena include recent anti-affirmative action measures and the
passage of punitive welfare reform legislation. Moreover, while pregnant women
who consume alcohol are subject to some level of social stigma, they are not subject
to criminal sanctions like pregnant women who smoke crack. The fact that alcohol is
legal and crack is not is largely attributable to the fact that many more White women
drink alcohol than smoke crack. Hence society has established other, noncriminal,
means by which to contend with these women and any harm caused to their fetuses.
176. Jos et al., supra note 17, at 124.
[VOL. 4:325
The Charleston Policy
Armed with the power to educate the public about the primary
causes of substance-addiction as well as the ability to help increase
the availability of treatment for those in need, the Policy framers
instead exploited the public's outrage over a perceived violation of
accepted moral norms.'7 In so doing, MUSC and the. solicitors
adopted a policy that directly and egregiously undermined the so-
cial, health and psychological conditions of pregnant Black women
and their children.
3. No Search Warrants or Consent to Searches
The Policy violated MUSC's own standards on informed con-
sent,17' patients' rights to privacy and confidentiality in medical
matters, and the right to refuse medical treatment.79 Medical pa-
tients' right to informed consent and the concomitant right to refuse
medical treatment are fundamental and well established tenets in
both American legal doctrine and biomedical standards. Health care
providers and their patients share a fiduciary relationship which
imposes upon providers an affirmative duty to maintain the confi-
dentiality of their patients. To this end, health care providers are
charged with safeguarding their patients' right to control the release
of private medical information, including information on their
health status and treatment. When this bond of trust is broken, the
therapeutic relationship between patients and health care providers
is detrimentally and often irreversibly affected.
While the Policy required women who wished to obtain treat-
ment at MUSC's obstetric clinic to sign a form consenting to medical
treatment, including a urine toxicology screen,"O no attempt was
made in these forms to obtain the patient's consent or authorization
177. See Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, The Crack Attack: Politics and Media
in the Crack Scare, in CRACK IN AMERICA 18, 23 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine,
eds., 1997). Many Americans bought into the inflammatory media coverage of and
political response to the rise in the use of crack cocaine during the late 1980's. In-
deed, crack and other illegal drugs were depicted as "virulent diseases that were
attacking American society." Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in Context:
America's Latest Demon Drug, in CRACK IN AMERICA, supra, at 1, 3.
178. See id.; JA, supra note 5, at 1442-443, 873 (noting that MUSC's general counsel
admitted that the consent forms might be inadequate. This was confirmed by the
trial court, which held that the Hospital's two general consent forms were "not
sufficient to warrant a search where the search information [was] furnished to law
enforcement officers.").
179. See JA, supra note 5, at 1481, quoted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 10
n.10 (noting that according to MUSC's Patient Handbook, "medical records and all
communication pertaining to [the patient's] care are also treated as confidential").
180. See MICH REPORT VOL. In1, supra note 30, at 25-26.
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to the disclosure of the information to the police department. 8' Nei-
ther the Solicitor's Office nor the CPD obtained search warrants,
subpoenas or court orders prior to the collection and search of a
pregnant woman's urine for drugs.82
MUSC's consent forms were constitutionally inadequate since
they authorized only "Medical Treatment" and sanctioned drug
testing "deemed advisable by [a] physician," and release of informa-
tion only as "required in the processing of applications for financial
coverage for services rendered."'' While MUCS's Consent to Am-
bulatory Care form allowed for consent to drug testing provided it
was "deemed advisable by or necessary in the professional judgment
of the physician" and afforded the "attending Physician"
"permission" "to reveal information to appropriate agencies and
individuals, ''l it is difficult to imagine that the women targeted
under the Policy understood that "appropriate agencies and indi-
viduals" were law enforcement authorities, not health care
personnel. This is particularly so in light of the fact that the drug
testing was addressed within the context of a "Consent to Ambula-
tory Care" form.'8
None of the other paper work related to the Policy sought the
patient's consent or authorization, and a letter regarding the Policy
was provided to the patient only after she had been drug screened. 6
The patient's signature on the letter was used only to acknowledge
that she had received it, according to the testimony of an Assistant
Solicitor.87 Despite the fact that all patients receiving prenatal care at
MUSC were to be provided a letter indicating that they might be
screened for drugs, this was not the case. The letter itself stated:
If however, we continue to detect evidence of drug abuse or
a failure to follow recommended treatment, we will
take action to protect your unborn child. The Charleston
Police, the Solicitor's Office, and the Protective Services
Division of the DSS are also committed to the protection
181. See JA, supra note 5, at 1443; Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 11.
182. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 14.
183. See JA, supra note 5, at 1442, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 10-
11.
184. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 11.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1990)
(upholding the distinction between the taking of blood for medical purposes and the
taking of blood for police use).
186. See JA, supra note 5, at 603, 1199-1200, 1432-34, noted in Brief of Appellants,
supra note 3, at 11 (letters stated "[d]uring your recent examination you tested posi-
tive for drugs").
187. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 11.
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of unborn and newborn children from the harms of ille-
gal drug abuse.'
Thus, the women were informed only after they had been
screened. Moreover, the letter did not disclose that the urine drug
screens were conducted for law enforcement purposes or that confi-
dential medical information procured in this manner would be
revealed to the CPD.
The drug screens performed on those patients identified pursu-
ant to the subjective criteria delineated in the protocol constituted
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus
required either a warrant based on reasonable suspicion or con-
sent."9 A search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable
cause is "per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions." 19' When consent is used to
justify the lawfulness of a search, it must be proven that consent was
not only given, but given "freely and voluntarily"'191 and was not the
result of express or implied duress or coercion.9 2 Accordingly, the
United States Supreme Court has maintained that a search con-
ducted "by stealth" is not consensual, but is "against the will of the
person searched" and thus does not pass constitutional muster.9
Consent is absent even when one agrees to a search, fully aware that
the search is being conducted for law enforcement purposes, if the
search is used for a different law enforcement purpose than the one
188. JA, supra note 5, at 1437, quoted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 12.
189. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (finding that Georgia's
drug testing requirement for candidates for designated state offices "effects a search
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"). The Fourth
Amendment states that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
190. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations omitted).
191. See id. at 222.
192. See id. at 248; see also Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158, 163 (1st Cir.
1967) (stating that consent must be "unequivocal, specific and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.") (citation omitted).
193. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment is violated when a man is granted entry into a suspect's house
by falsely representing that he intended to pay a social visit, and then goes through
and seizes the suspect's private papers); see also United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297,
299 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that where an IRS agent failed to disclose the criminal
nature of an audit, he engaged in "a sneaky deliberate deception.., and a flagrant
disregard for appellant's rights [and that] the silent misrepresentation was both
intentionally misleading and material").
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disclosed.194  And, consent to "administrative',195  rather than
"criminal" searches must still be knowingly obtained.1 96
Consultation with a health care provider for a specific purpose
does not constitute a general consent to investigate unrelated medi-
cal conditions. This is true regardless of whether or not the
investigation involved a physically noninvasive urine test. Health
care providers are required to follow informed consent processes,
including disclosure, voluntariness and patient comprehension.
They must also respect a patient's right to refuse treatment, which
can be overridden only in those instances when the patient is inca-
pable of making the decision or when the patient poses a threat to
herself or others. 97 Thus, the relationship is one based on the pa-
tient's confidence that her healthcare provider will both protect her
interests and remain committed to her "well being." Breaches of
confidentiality, medical coercion and punitive incarceration under-
mine trust, which in turn keeps patients from seeking necessary
198
care.
194. See Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding a search inad-
missible where police officer requested blood sample from drunken suspect to
determine its alcohol content, without indicating that the suspect was under suspi-
cion of rape).
195. Administrative searches are subject to a lower standard of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
634 (1989) (upholding the reasonableness of federal regulation requiring blood and
urine drug tests of rail employees involved in train accidents).
196. Compare Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 37 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (holding that
student's consent to breathalyzer was valid where student "was fully aware of his
options before taking the test and knowingly agreed to take it because he thought
that he could 'pass' it") with Anable v. Ford, 663 F. Supp. 149, 152 (W.D. Ark. 1985)
(holding student's consent was insufficient because she was not fully informed and
was misled).
197. See Jos et al., supra note 17, at 123.
198. This fact is so uncontroverted that in 1972 the U.S. Congress enacted legisla-
tion directly addressing this truth. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (Supp. I 1999). This
legislation specifically prohibits the disclosure of patients' records by drug programs
and especially for use to substantiate or initiate any criminal charge. Indeed, Con-
gress, in the Congressional Conference Report issued in connection with 21 U.S.C.
§ 1175, the statutory predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2, explicitly acknowledged that
public disclosure of a patient's addiction status jeopardizes rehabilitation efforts:
The conferees wish to stress their conviction that the strictest adher-
ence to the provisions of this section is absolutely essential to the
success of all drug abuse prevention programs. Every patient and
former patient must be assured that his right to privacy will be pro-
tected. Without that assurance, fear of public disclosure of drug
abuse or of records that will attach for life will discourage thousands
from seeking the treatment they must have if this tragic national
problem is to be overcome.
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4. Violation of Patient Confidentiality
The criminalization of prenatal drug addiction forces health
care providers to breach patient confidentiality when it is most criti-
cally needed. Patients must provide accurate information about
substance-addiction to their medical providers in order to ensure
that they receive proper prenatal care.' Deputizing health care pro-
viders as law enforcement officials undermines this goal by creating
a strong incentive for a substance-dependent patient to withhold
information crucial to her care and that of the child she carries.2 °
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 92-920, 33 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2045, 2072,
quoted in Conmissioner of Social Services v. David R.S., 436 N.E.2d 451, 454 n.4
(1982) (reversing order to disclose drug abuse treatment records in paternity pro-
ceedings); see also Local 738 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Certified Grocers Midwest,
Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D.Ill. 1990) (denying enforcement of arbitration subpoena
seeking disclosure of patient drug abuse treatment records).
199. As one text noted:
To make diagnoses and treat patients effectively, the physician must
obtain sensitive information about a patient. A patient must be will-
ing to tell a physician, who is often a total stranger, about such
matters as drug usage ... and to allow the physician to examine in-
timate parts of his or her anatomy. The promise of confidentiality
encourages patients to disclose sensitive subjects to a physician with-
out fear that an embarrassing condition will be revealed to
unauthorized people. Violation of confidentiality also shows disre-
spect to the patient as a human being....
R. Arnold et al., Medical Ethics and Doctor/Patient Communication, in THE MEDICAL
INTERVIEW: CLINICAL CARE, EDUCATION AND RESEARCH 345, 365 (M. Lipkin, Jr. et al.
eds., 1995) (citation omitted).
200. In a series of interviews conducted with women who used drugs while
pregnant, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") sought information on these
women's "views and experiences on barriers that prevented them, or women they
knew, from receiving drug treatment." See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADMS
BLOCK GRANT: WOMEN'S SET-ASIDE DOES NOT ASSURE DRUG TREATMENT FOR
PREGNANT WOMEN 4 (1991) [hereinafter ADMS BLOCK GRANT]. The GAO concluded
that "[t]he threat of prosecution poses yet another barrier to treatment for pregnant
women and mothers with young children." Id.
Indeed, according to the Institute of Medicine:
Pregnant women who are aware that their life-styles place their
health and that of their babies at risk may also fear seeking care be-
cause they anticipate sanction or pressure to change such habits as
drugs and alcohol abuse, heavy smoking, and eating disorders. Sub-
stance abusers in particular may delay care because of the stress and
disorganization that often surrounds their lives, and because they
fear that if their use of drugs is uncovered, they will be arrested and
their other children taken into custody.
Brief of the American Public Health Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 9, Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) [hereinafter
Whitner Amicus Brief] (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PRENATAL CARE 79 (1988)).
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An environment of trust and communication is a necessary
component of any effort to reduce or prevent harm to infants ex-
posed to drugs prenatally.201 This can, in fact, significantly reduce the
harm to a woman and her child in several ways. For example, a
patient's drug use is seldom apparent unless the patient discloses it,
as drug use is currently the most commonly missed diagnosis in
obstetric and pediatric medicine. °2 Thus, the patient and her child
are far better off if she trusts her health care provider and is willing
to divulge extremely personal, often stigmatizing, and possibly in-
criminating information.2° Yet, even if the patient is unable to
overcome her addiction, potential dangerous health consequences
can be mitigated or reduced through adequate prenatal care and
counseling.0 4
In addition, open communication with physicians regarding
drug use is necessary to ensure safe deliveries.2' Adequate parenting
skills and a supportive environment fostered by a committed part-
nership with health care providers can minimize risk factors causedby prenatal drug exposure.2°6Comprehensive studies of deterrents to
prenatal care have concluded that women are less likely to seek such
care "if they have had unpleasant experiences with providers."2 7 To
be sure, knowledge that discovery of maternal drug use will lead to
201. See Lindesmith Center Amicus Brief, supra note 158, at 148; see also M.J. Kreek
& M. Reisinger, The Addict as a Patient, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 822, 830 ("It is
quite clear that part of treating [a substance-addicted individual] as a patient in-
cludes embracing all of the appropriate ethical constraints of health care delivery
.... Possibly at the top of the list of ethical issues that are of very special and funda-
mental importance to this group of patients is the appropriate maintenance of
confidentiality."); R. Elk et al., Behavioral Interventions: Effective and Adaptable for the
Treatment of Pregnant Cocaine-Dependent Women, 27 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 627, 630 & 632
(1997) ("Confidentiality must be rigidly adhered to and a trust in the staff estab-
lished: to attract to and retain in treatment pregnant drug-dependent women.");
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG DEP., POLICY STATEMENT, WOMEN,
ALCOHOL, OTHER DRUGS AND PREGNANCY 5 (1990) ("States should resist efforts to
weaken confidentiality protections for pregnant alcoholic and other drug-dependent
women seeking prenatal care or alcoholism and/or drug treatment services.").
202. See Ira J. Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy: Parameters of Risk, 35 PEDIATRIC
CLINICS OF NORTH AM. 1403, 1410 (1988).
203. See Lindesmith Center Amicus Brief, supra note 158, at 148.
204. See id.
205. See id. (citing David J. Birnbach et al., Cocaine Screening of Parturients Without
Prenatal Care: An Evaluation of a Rapid Screening Assay, 84 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA
76, 76 (1997)) (stating that patients using cocaine may have untoward responses to
anesthesia, yet identification of such patients prior to the initiation of anesthesia has
proven difficult since many patients deny illicit drug use).
206. See Lindesmith Center Amicus Brief, supra note 158, at 148.
207. STATE COUNCIL ON MATERNAL, INFANT AND CHILD HEALTH, OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNOR, 2 1991 SOUTH CAROLINA STUDY OF DRUG USE AMONG WOMEN GIVING




arrest and prosecution could be classified as an "unpleasant experi-
ence."
28
The women subjected to the Policy were unaware that MUSC's
confidentiality requirements did not apply to the results of their
urine tests. In fact, MUSC's Patient Handbook, shown to all who
came to the hospital for care, stated that "medical records and all
communications pertaining to your care are also treated as confiden-
tial."2" In the private obstetrics department, for example, patient
confidentiality was maintained and patient records were held in
confidence unless written permission to release them was ob-
tained.21°
Most of the women arrested under the Policy said that they as-
sumed that they would be helped, not arrested, if they went to the
hospital for care.211 The women did not know that their medical
providers would disclose information about their drug addiction to
the police.212 Even those women who had an idea that drug use dur-
ing pregnancy might be considered illegal believed that their
physicians and hospital personnel would aid them in obtaining help
for their addiction, and were stunned by the discovery that their
health care providers were working in conjunction with the police.
The results of the urinalysis along with other confidential medi-
cal information were disclosed to the Solicitor's Office or the CPD,
despite MUSC's lack of authority to do so. Urine tests that indi-
cated cocaine use were recorded in the patient's medical chart and
214on Rolodex cards maintained by the Nurse in her office. Positive
208. See Whitner Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 9-10. A Detroit study of 142
women to determine the effects of threats of punitive action by medical providers on
maternal drug use concluded that substance-addicted pregnant women would likely
go underground and avoid medical treatment for fear of incarceration and loss of
their children. See Marilyn L. Poland et al., Punishing Pregnant Drug Users: Enhancing
the Flight from Care, 31 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 199, 202 (1993). Moreover,
the same research team which conducted this study attempted to duplicate the study
in another state where prosecutors were threatening incarceration for prenatal drug
addiction, but were unable to find participants since all known drug addicted post-
partum women refused to participate for fear of further self-incrimination. See id. at
202.
209. JA, supra note 5, at 1481, quoted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 10 n.10.
210. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 9.
211. See JA, supra note 5, at 380, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 14.
212. See JA, supra note 5, at 199, 244; Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 14.
213. See JA, supra note 5, at 199, 244, 322; Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 10.
MUSC had also collected such private information as the patient's medical history,
incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, sterilization procedures done while in the
hospital, HIV status, and any past abortions. All of this information was disclosed to
the CPD officer who came to the hospital to arrest the patient. See Brief of Appel-
lants, supra note 3, at 14-15.
214. See JA, supra note 5, at 609-10, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 14.
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results were provided to the Solicitor's Office and, in some circum-
stances, to the CPD.215 Solicitor's Office personnel, in fact, had access
to the Rolodex and files kept in the Nurse's office.
16
Those patients who tested positive were traced in accordance
with the Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect ("SCAN") meetings at
which MUSC personnel, the DSS, the Solicitor's Office and the CPD
discussed suspected child abuse.217 Prior to each meeting, confiden-
tial information on each patient to be discussed, including HIV
status and information on tubal ligations, was sent to all those who
were to attend the SCAN meeting.
With the information provided by MUSC personnel, the CPD
would go to the hospital to arrest those identified. No referrals to
drug treatment programs were provided to these women, nor were
they given the opportunity to obtain treatment as an alternative to
arrest.218 At the time the convictions occurred, there were no long-
term residential treatment centers with child care facilities and
women-only services.219 Indeed, no residential treatment center op-
erating solely for substance-addicted women existed in South
Carolina at the time the Policy was implemented.220 Thus, the solici-
tors did not know whether any social services were available to the
women they prosecuted. Even if they had been aware of the possi-
bility of treatment, they were unwilling to address the question of
access to the resources, such as child-care and transportation serv-
ices, that are necessary to make rehabilitation a viable option.221 One
215. See JA, supra note 5, at 879-80, 1062-63, 1413, noted in Brief of Appellants,
supra note 3, at 14.
216. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 14.
217. See JA, supra note 5, at 914-15, noted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 15.
218. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 17.
219. The Charleston County Substance Abuse Commission's women-only "New
Life" program was not available until November, 1994, by which time the Policy had
been discontinued.
220. Until 1992, there was not one drug treatment program in all of South Caro-
lina designed to meet the specific needs of pregnant and parenting substance-
addicted women and their children. See SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON ALCOHOL
AND DRUG ABUSE, ANNUAL REPORT 1991-1992 66 (1992) (announcing the April 1992
opening of South Carolina's first residential treatment program for women).
221. See MICH REPORT VOL. II, supra note 207, at 2 ("Barriers to treatment for
women include the use of male-oriented therapies in most programs, lack of ade-
quate child care, inadequate financial resources and limited transportation."). These
barriers prevent women from obtaining appropriate treatment. See id.j at Appendix,
Alcohol and Drug Treatment Services Available for Pregnant Women. For example, failure
to provide child care services "effectively precludes the participation of women in
drug treatment." Wendy Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail Addicted Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, July
18, 1989, at A21. Similarly, research on appropriate treatment programs for pregnant
women indicates "that long-term (12 to 18 months) residential care is the most effec-
tive." MICH REPORT VOL. II, supra note 207, at 9; see also Wendy Chavkin, Mandatory
Treatment for Drug Use During Pregnancy, 266 JAMA 1556 (1991); Wendy Chavkin et
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woman, Crystal Ferguson, was unable to comply with a MUSC
nurse's directive that she enter the hospital's two-week in-patient
drug treatment program, since she had no one to care for her young
children.m Despite the fact that she repeatedly explained her child-
care dilemma and requested outpatient treatment, she was arrested
for her inability to seek inpatient care.2
IV. UTILIZING CRIMINAL PENALTIES To ADDRESS HEALTH ISSUES
MATERIALLY HARMS WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN
By January 1990, less than five months after initial implementa-
tion, a decision was made to revise the Policy to permit MUSC to
threaten arrest if those women identified did not enroll in a drug
treatment program.2 24 With no research to support the medical effi-
cacy of the Policy, and no input from experts on substance abuse
treatment for pregnant women, the Policy was adopted on the basis
of anecdotal and discredited evidence.m The effects of drugs on fetal
development can be determined only through careful analysis of the
complicated interplay of dosage, timing and duration of exposure to
chemical, genetic and/or other biological factors in addition to other
al., Reframing the Debate: Toward Effective Treatment for Inner City Drug-Abusing Moth-
ers, 70 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 50 (1993). According to the General Accounting Office,
the most significant obstacle to pregnant women receiving proper treatment is "the
lack of adequate treatment capacity and appropriate services among programs that
will treat pregnant women and mothers with young children. The demand for drug
treatment uniquely designated for pregnant women exceeds supply." ADMS BLOCK
GRANT, supra note 193, at 12, 15.
222. While there were four inpatient drug treatment programs in South Carolina,
in reality none were available to many substance-dependent pregnant women,
because none provided services to children. See Whitner Anicus Brief, supra note
200, at 13-14, n.15 (citing ELIZABETH D. JONES & LORI ACKATZ, AVAILABILITY OF
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAMS FOR PREGNANT WOMEN: RESULTS FROM
THREE NATIONAL SURVEYS (1992)).
223. See JA, supra note 5, at 367-68. Ms. Ferguson was arrested because she re-
fused to go to inpatient treatment because of her child care concerns. However, a
White woman, who similarly refused treatment, was able to avoid arrest. See Brief of
Appellants, supra note 3, at 27.
224. The push for revision was fueled in large part by concern that women were
arrested without being given any opportunity for drug treatment. See JA, supra note
5, at 1147. Indeed, one of the Policy implementers noted that "[o]f the 12 cases re-
ferred under the Policy during that period [October 3 to December 1, 19891, 8 were
first identified following admission to Hospital during labor, so there was no op-
portunity for the mother to enter drug treatment and avoid arrest prior to the
delivery." JA, supra note 5, at 1427, quoted in Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 21.
225. MUSC relied upon a health care technician's "claim that cocaine use was
increasing which was based on 'tick marks' she kept on files in her office." Brief of
Appellants, supra note 3, at 28 n.28.
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considerations. Nonetheless, the Policy did not include a scientifi-
cally sound evaluation mechanism designed either to support or
assess the efficacy of the Policy.u7 The primary designers of the Pol-
icy "were not able to establish the extent of illegal drug use among
the MUSC obstetrical population because not all patients were
screened, nor could they account for the impact of other regional
obstetrical care programs on the clinic's population."28
The Policy discouraged women from seeking medical assistance
from health and social service professionals, "the very people who
are best able to prevent future abuse." 29 In fact, MUSC's own studies
and reports indicate that the Policy ultimately deterred women from
obtaining necessary prenatal care. ° Shame, fear of incarceration,
and fear of losing one's children are primary factors that keep sub-
stance-dependent mothers from seeking drug treatment, prenatal
care and other medical and social services.23 This situation places
women and children in greater jeopardy than would have been the
case had they received such care, 2 while at the same time increases
the cost of providing needed care after-the-fact.'
Since MUSC could not determine whether the declining num-
bers of positive drug tests were the result of women avoiding
226. See Barry Zuckerman, Drug-Exposed Infants: Understanding the Medical Risk, 1
FUTURE CHILDREN 26, 26-28 (1991).
227. See Jos et al., supra note 17, at 125.
228. Id.
229. Cole, supra note 8, at 2669; see also Blank, supra note 8, at 84.
230. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 22.
231. See Whitner Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 9; Cole, supra note 8, at 2667
("Pregnant women will be likely to avoid seeking prenatal or other medical care for
fear that their physicians' knowledge of substance abuse or other potentially harmful
behavior could result in a jail sentence rather than proper medical treatment.");
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, RESOLUTION 131, TREATMENT VERSUS CRIMI-
NALIZATION-PHYSICIAN ROLE IN DRUG ADDICTION DURING PREGNANCY A-90 (1990)
(stating that "[iut is the policy of the AMA to oppose legislation which criminalizes
maternal drug addiction").
232. According to a study conducted by the Center for Health Policy Research of
George Washington University, "fear of criminal prosecution may ... keep pregnant
substance abusers away from vital prenatal care exacerbating possible fetal harm."
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, AN ANALYSIS OF
RESOURCES TO AID DRUG-EXPOSED INFANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 78 (1993).
233. The average cost of medical care for the first thirty days after delivery for a
cocaine-addicted woman who received prenatal care is $7000, versus $31,000 spent
caring for the cocaine-addicted woman who did not receive prenatal care. See Mi-
chelle D. Wilkins, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse: An Analysis of
Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1441 (1990) (citing Tele-
phone Interview with Pat O'Keefe, Director of Communications for Perinatal
Addiction Research and Education (Jan. 18, 1990)). Moreover, according to former
Assistant Health Secretary Philip Lee, "[elvery dollar invested in drug treatment can
save $7 in societal and medical costs." Treat But Don't Jail Addicts, Study Says, POST &
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), March 18, 1998, at 1A.
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treatment at MUSC or the result of any of a number of other factors,
the policy yielded no evidence whatsoever about the effectiveness of
punitive intervention with regard to either the health of mothers or
the health of children removed from their influence.'
The Policy did little more than punish women for their sub-
stance addiction during pregnancy, rather than address the health
problems related to such circumstances. This is so notwithstanding
the fact that chronic drug addiction is a disease.ns The Policy ran
afoul of the well-established principle that the imposition of criminal
penalties for one's status violates the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution.3
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that sub-
stance addiction is a disease, and that substance addicts are "proper
subjects for [medical] treatment. ' '237 This precept provided the foun-
dation for the Court's determination in Robinson v. California that
addiction should be treated as a health problem, and not punished
as a crime.23 The medical community has also long emphasized that
"addiction is a chronic illness that is never cured but from which one
may nonetheless recover."239
Despite the wealth of information on the issue, the imple-
menters of the Policy completely ignored the larger structural
reasons for why women begin using cocaine in the first place. An-
swers to questions like these are crucial to finding an effective
solution to the problem of addiction. Substance-addiction is caused
by complex physical, social and psychological factors. The women
most likely to be prosecuted for prenatal cocaine exposure must
234. See Jos et al., supra note 17, at 125.
235. According to Dr. June Osborn of the new Physician Leadership on National
Drug Policy (an organization of prominent physicians and leaders in the public
health field from the Clinton, Bush, and Reagan administrations, which coruris-
sioned research from a number of universities), "We've been telling people to 'just
say no' when addiction is a biological event." Treat But Don't Jail Addicts, Study Says,
POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), March 18, 1998, at 1A. See United States v. South-
ern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 921 (4th Cir. 1992) (both the World Health
Organization and the American Psychiatric Association classify substance addiction
as a disease).
236. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that addiction
cannot be the basis for criminal prosecution under the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment); see also Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F.
Supp. 1551, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that arresting homeless persons for per-
forming such activities as sleeping and standing in public violates the Eighth
Amendment).
237. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (finding that a physician who
provided narcotics to patient in the course of medical treatment for substance addic-
tion did not violate the Narcotics Law).
238. 370 U.S. at 667.
239. See Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d at 920.
SPRING 1999]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
frequently contend with severe life stress which often leads to
dependency.24 Studies have concluded that single mothers experi-
ence higher levels of stress than most groups, few existing support
networks, lower general well-being, and higher rates of depression,
all of which put them at risk for physical and emotional illness, in-
cluding substance abuse.241
Often those who become addicted to cocaine are from commu-
nities that are extremely poor, alienated from health care and other
social services, and plagued by domestic violence, poor educational
institutions and few job opportunities.2'4 Substance-addicted women
commonly have histories of childhood sexual abuse and ongoing
physical and sexual abuse.2" For example, in one study 74% of sub-
stance-dependent women reported incidents of sexual abuse.244 In
another study, 15% of pregnant addicted women reported that they
were raped as children, 19% were beaten as children, 21% were
raped as adults, and 74% were beaten as adults.245 Studies have
shown that between 80% to 90% of substance-addicted women have
been victims of rape or incest.246 In addition, these women are often
pressured into their first drug experience by the same men who
247physically abuse them. Many experts assert that in order to allevi-
ate the pain and anxiety caused by these life experiences and
ongoing maltreatment, many abused women "self medicate"
through the use of alcohol, drugs, and prescription medication.
24
Given the array of serious and debilitating social and psycho-
logical factors that lead to substance addiction, the characterization
of women who fall prey to this problem as child abusers is deplor-
able. Even more troubling, the portrayal of these women as
240. See MICH REPORT VOL. II, supra note 207, at 14 ("The majority of addicted
women were sexually abused as children, are currently being battered, are children
of parents who abused alcohol and other drugs, or are depressed and suffer from
low self-esteem.").
241. See Whitner Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 5.
242. See Cole, supra note 8, at 2667 ("[Slubstance abuse is caused by complex
hereditary, environmental, and social factors.").
243. See Whitner Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 4.
244. See id. (citing N. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., GETrING SOBER, GETTING WELL: A
TREATMENT GUIDE FOR CAREGIVERS WHO WORK WITH WOMEN 244 (1990)).
245. See id. (citing Dianne 0. Regan et al., Infants of Drug Addicts: At Risk for Child
Abuse, Neglect, and Placement in Foster Care, 9 NEUROTOXICOLOGY AND TERATOLOGY
315, 317 (1987).
246. Lisa Leff, Treating Drug Addiction with the Woman in Mind, WASH. POST, Mar.
5, 1990, at El, E4.
247. See Whitner Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 4 & n.7 ("The Women's Drug
Research Project found that over 85% of the women who used drugs were living
with male spouses or partners who were drug abusers.").
248. See id. at 5 (citing Hortensia Amaro et al., Violence During Pregnancy and
Substance Use, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 575, 578 (1990)).
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criminals wrongly assumes that they intend to harm their future
children.4 9 Clearly, this is not the case. As the National Association
for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education ("NAPARE") has
stated: "These women are addicts who become pregnant, not preg-
nant women who decide to use drugs and become addicts. They do
not want or intend to harm their ... children by using drugs . . .
Indeed, The American Medical Association has maintained that "it is
clear that addiction is not simply the product of a failure of individ-
ual will power."25'
Startlingly few resources have been made available for
women's substance abuse treatment.22 As a result, there is a severe
249. Many public health groups are opposed to relying on drug tests since they
are often inaccurate, do not measure the severity of drug dependency and are not
reliable predictors of parental fitness. According to the California Medical Associa-
tion and a division of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists:
[Pirenatal substance abuse by an addicted mother does not reflect
willful maltreatment of a fetus, nor is it necessarily evidence that the
mother will abuse her child after birth. A woman with a substance
abuse problem may genuinely desire to terminate the use of such
substances prenatally but may be unable, without access to substance
abuse treatment programs, to act on her desire. However, after the
child is born, the mother may be able to provide the child with an
adequate home environment. In the absence of tangible evidence that
she will be unable to do so, she should be permitted to raise her
child, with the assistance of family, friends and voluntary social
services.
Amicus Curiae Brief of California Medical Association and American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, District 9, at 3-4.
250. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PERINATAL ADDICTION RESEARCH AND
EDUCATION, NAPARE POLICY STATEMENT No. 1, CRIMINALIZATION OF PRENATAL
USE: PUNITIVE MEASURES WILL BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE (1990); see also Cole, supra
note 8, at 2667-68:
Punishing a person for substance abuse is generally ineffective be-
cause it ignores the impaired capacity of substance-abusing
individuals to make decisions for themselves. In all but a few cases,
taking a harmful substance such as cocaine is not meant to harm the
fetus but to satisfy an acute psychological and physical need for that
particular substance. If a pregnant woman suffers from a substance
dependency, it is the physical impossibility of avoiding an impact on
fetal health that causes severe damage to the fetus, not an intentional
or malicious wish to cause harm.
251. Cole, supra note 8, at 2667 (citing Drug Abuse in the United States: A Policy
Report, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 137TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (June 26-30, 1988)).
252. See Whitmer Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 11 ("Approximately 80% of the
treatment resources in this country are spent treating men.") (citing NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF STATE ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE DIRECTORS, SURVEY OF STATE
ALCOHOL AND DRUG AGENCY USE OF FY 1989 FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDS tbl. 2 (1990)
[hereinafter NASADAD SURVEY]).
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dearth of treatment programs catering to the specific needs of
women in this country. 3 Because substance addiction has histori-
cally been a problem largely associated with men,2 pregnant
women remain marginalized by the drug and alcohol treatment
systems and are often refused treatment for their addictions 55 Ac-
cording to a comprehensive three-year study of perinatal substance
abuse in southern states, pregnant women represent less than 1% of
the total patients served in substance abuse treatment programs.25 In
South Carolina, although an estimated 6385 pregnant women are in
need of treatment, only 633 or 9% actually receive it.V7 While the
federal government, in order to meet the unique treatment needs of
women, has provided states with special Women's Set-Aside funds,
many states are not using the funds appropriately. 58 As a result,
many drug-exposed infants and their mothers still go largely un-
treated.259 In fact, of all funds appropriated for treatment services in
South Carolina, the state spends just 16% on treatment for women.26O
Meaningful access to prenatal care is particularly important for
substance-dependent pregnant women. However, low-income preg-
nant and post-partum women must contend with barriers to basic
medical care due largely to the fact that they often lack adequate
253. See id. at 13-14 (citing Beth Glover Reed, Developing Women-Sensitive Drug
Dependence Treatment Services: Why So Difficult?, 19 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 151, 153
(1987)).
254. See id. at 11 (the Katzenbach Commission Report issued in 1967 described the
substance addict as "likely to be male between the ages of 21 and 31, poorly educated
and unskilled, and a member of a disadvantaged ethnic minority group.").
255. See id. at 12 (citing Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy
Crossroads, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 483, 485 (1990)); see also Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases
N. Gen. Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 523, 524 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting hospital policy precluding
all pregnant women from drug detoxification services in absence of a determination
of medical necessity for such policy under New York Human Rights Law); Lisa
Brennan, Pregnant Addicts Seek Treatment Plan, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 11, 1994, at
1 (detailing public hearing by Philadelphia Human Relations Commission address-
ing pregnancy discrimination by Philadelphia drug and alcohol treatment
providers).
256. See Whitner Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 12. A review by the Select Com-
mittee on Children and Youth of the United States House of Representatives of large
urban hospitals revealed that two-thirds did not have anywhere to refer substance-
dependent pregnant women for treatment. See id. at 13 (citing Donna R. Weston, et
al., Drug Exposed Babies: Research and Clinical Issues, in ZERO TO THREE 4 (Jeree Pawl,
ed., 1989)).
257. See id. at 13. (citing NASADAD SURVEY, supra note 252, at tbl.3).
258. See id. (citing Frederic Suffet et al., Treatment of the Pregnant Addict: A Histori-
cal Overview, in PREGNANT ADDICTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A COMPREHENSIVE CARE
APPROACH 13, 18-19 (Richard Brotman et al. eds., 1985)).
259. See id.
260. See id. (citing NASADAD SURVEY, supra note 252, at tbl.2).
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261health insurance or the funds necessary to obtain care. An
estimated 43.5% of all pregnant women in South Carolina do not
receive adequate prenatal care. 62 This is so despite the fact that it is
widely agreed that universal access to prenatal care for pregnant
women is the most important means of improving the health of
infants. For example, cocaine-addicted women who have at least
four prenatal check-ups are half as likely as those who receive no
such care to give birth to infants with dangerously low-birth
weight.264
Health care access problems are compounded for indigent,
drug-addicted pregnant women who also face barriers to adequate
drug treatment.26 Indeed, 89% of the directors of drug and alcohol
departments in South Carolina report that lack of child care services
is the most significant barrier to providing treatment services to
pregnant women. Access to drug-treatment is an important and
necessary component of any meaningful health care regimen for
substance-dependent pregnant women and their infants. According
to NAPARE:
Important methods for preventing or minimizing fetal
harm due to substance abuse by pregnant women in-
clude identification of women who are at high risk for
being substance abusers, early medical and psycho-
therapeutic intervention in the pregnancies of
substance-abusing women, and access to programs
that address the full range of social and health care
needs associated with substance abuse.267
Conversely, criminal prosecution exacerbates existing health
problems; poor nutrition and inadequate healthcare compound the
261. See ADMS BLOCK GRANT, supra note 200, at 36; see also U.S. Panel Urges
Universal Access to Prenatal Care, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 1989, at 11 (arguing that
employers should offer health insurance that includes maternal care).
262. See MICH REPORT VOL. H, supra note 207, at 7.
263. See Blank, supra note 8, at 84 (citing the Institute of Medicine, the United
States Public Health Service Expert Panel on the Content of Prenatal Care, and the
United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment). According to the Southern
Regional Project on Infant Mortality, "one of the most effective weapons against
infant mortality is early, high quality, comprehensive prenatal care." SRPIM REPORT,
supra note 118, at 6.
264. Andrew Racine et al., The Association Between Prenatal Care and Birth Weight
Among Women Exposed to Cocaine in New York City, 270 JAMA 1581, 1585 (1993).
265. See Whitner Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 13-14.
266. See Whitner Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 14 (citing ELIZABETH D. JONES &
LORI ACKATZ, AVAILABILITY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAMS FOR
PREGNANT WOMEN: RESULTS FROM THREE NATIONAL SURVEYS 7 (1992)).
267. Cole, supra note 8, at 2668-69.
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effects of cocaine in ways that make it virtually impossible to isolate
the harm caused by cocaine from other negative influences on child-
bearing associated with poverty.268
Despite overwhelming evidence that even basic prenatal care
improves pregnancy outcomes for all mothers, universal access to
prenatal care is still a long way off.269 It would have been more con-
sistent with South Carolina's avowed concern for maternal and fetal
health to give expectant mothers access to proper nutrition, coun-
seling, mental health and substance abuse treatment, and adequate
prenatal care. Such support is necessary to enable pregnant women
to make informed health decisions for themselves and their chil-
dren.27° Indeed, "[u]nless society is willing to expend considerable
resources to overcome the problems of poverty, illiteracy, housing
and lack of access to quality prenatal care and meaningful employ-
ment for women of childbearing age, the future will continue to look
bleak for many children."
271
While MUSC attempted to justify the Policy as a mechanism for
protecting the health of the pregnant woman and her fetus or new-
born child, no significant evidence has been proffered to demonstrate
that the Policy has had any such salutary effect. Rather, it was puni-
tive in terms of both its orientation and its effect. The implementers
of the Policy claimed that they worked diligently to get the women
to change their behavior, however, in reality nothing was done for
them.272
268. See Jos et al., supra note 17, at 126.
269. See SRPIM REPORT, supra note 118, at 6.
270. See Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrific-
ing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 571 (1992) (arguing for facilitative policies
that provide women choices, not coercive and punitive policies that create conflict
between women's liberty and the promotion of healthy births).
271. Blank, supra note 8, at 83. According to State Council on Maternal, Infant and
Child Health:
[L]aw enforcement agencies should not consider prosecution of
women for failure to obtain care that isn't available to them. The
criminal justice system cannot serve as a mechanism to force women
to obtain treatment if the treatment services do not exist. The criminal
justice system cannot solve problems of education, treatment, reha-
bilitation and family support.... Criminal sanctions are not a
substitute for adequate treatment and, if used at all, should be used
only after other less coercive measured have proved inadequate.
MICH REPORT VOL. II, supra note 207, at 10-11.
272. The National Institute of Health Office for Protection from Research Risks
determined that the Policy constituted experimentation on human subjects con-
ducted without prior examination by and approval from the Internal Review Board.
See Jos et al., supra note 17, at 120.
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, in order to capitalize on the
public's alarmed response, policy makers nationwide began intro-
ducing bills and implementing policies criminalizing maternal drug-
dependency,2'7 mandating the reporting of substance-dependent
individuals to the authorities, and separating infants from their
mothers27 While other states abandoned similar efforts in the wakeS" 276
of federal constitutional challenges, South Carolina did not, even
though virtually every medical, public health and children's rights
organization in the country has unequivocally opposed policies that
use threats of prosecution to address substance addiction.2z South
273. See Loren Siegel, The Pregnancy Police Fight the War on Drugs, in CRACK IN
AMERICA, supra note 177, at 249 ("During the late 1980s, as the specter of 'crack
babies' haunted American political rhetoric, more than two hundred criminal prose-
cutions were initiated against women in almost twenty states."); see also CAROL S.
LARSON, CENTER FOR THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, OVERVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATIVE
AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES 72-84 (Spring 1991) (reporting state legislative and judicial
actions taken in response to infants exposed to drugs prenatally); Kary Moss, Sub-
stance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278, 292-93 (1990) (surveying
state laws addressing maternal substance-addiction).
274. Twelve states now have laws requiring the reporting of pregnant women's
drug use to child welfare agencies. These states include: Arizona, California, Illinois,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(B) (West 1998); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11165.13 (West 1998); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.3b (West 1998); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 232.68(2)(f), 232.77(2) (West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 119,
§ 51A (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.623a (1998); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-
2403.1, 63.1-248.3(A1) (Michie 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.0255 (West 1998).
275. A study conducted in Pinellas County, Florida concluded that Black women
were ten times more likely than White women to be reported to civil authorities for
prenatally exposing an infant to a controlled substance and to have their children
taken away from them. See Chasnoff, supra note 19, at 1204.
276. From 1977 to the present, prosecutors in more than thirty states have at-
tempted to use existing criminal laws to punish women for behavior during
pregnancy that could be harmful to their fetuses. However, with the exception of the
South Carolina Supreme Court, every state court of last resort, as well as all interme-
diate appellate courts and numerous trial courts have rejected the use of child
endangerment and other criminal statutes to punish women for their conduct during
pregnancy. See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995);
Reyes v. Superior Court of San Bernadino County, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (4th Dist. 1977);
State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1997); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992);
State v. Gethers, 585 So.2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Welch,
864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991),
amended by 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992);
Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996); Wisconsin ex re. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729
(Wis. 1997). Even the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy under
then-President Bush acknowledged that the policies calling for the prosecution of
pregnant drug-addicted women had been unsuccessful. THE WHITE HOUSE,
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 53(1990).
277. The American Academy of Pediatrics, American Medical Association,
American Public Health Association, American Society on Addiction Medicine,
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, and the American Nurses Associa-
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Carolina's Policy alone unlawfully targeted and needlessly stigma-
tized Black women, frightening them away from needed prenatal
care and placing them in an adversarial relationship with their own
fetuses.
Instead of recognizing the symbiotic connection that exists be-
tween a woman and her fetus, the Solicitors opted to create an
adversarial relationship between the two, pitting one against the
other . 27 8 This was so despite the fact that the interests of pregnant
women and fetuses are the same; they are one entity, not two separate
beings . 2 7 The Policy was enforced for five years, notwithstanding the
tion, among others, have decried the imposition of criminal sanctions as inimical to a
physician's role of promoting maternal and fetal health. See Jos et al. supra note 17, at
123. Moreover, even the state's own organizations, the South Carolina Alliance for
Children and the South Carolina Medical Association, have unequivocally opposed
the implementation of such policies as the Policy. See id.
278. As Helene Cole noted:
Criminal penalties would also emphasize conflict between the preg-
nant woman and her fetus, which does not encourage a healthy
relationship between the pregnant woman and her future child. On
the other hand, providing education and treatment emphasizes co-
operation and trust between the pregnant woman and her physician
and facilitates a more emotionally positive relationship after birth.
Cole, supra note 8, at 2669 (citing Coordinating Federal Drug Policy for Women,
Infants and Children: Hearing before Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 101st
Cong. 1 (1989)).
279. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Stallman v. Youngquist, recognized, in
refusing to allow a cause of action for maternal prenatal negligence, the unique
relationship between the pregnant-women and the fetus:
Since anything which a pregnant woman does or does not do may
have an impact, either positive or negative, on her developing fetus,
any act or omission on her part could render her liable to her subse-
quently born child .... Any action which negatively impacted on
fetal development would be a breach of the pregnant woman's duty
to her developing fetus. Mother and child would be legal adversaries
from the moment of conception until birth ..... Holding a mother li-
able for the unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries subjects to
State scrutiny all the decisions a woman must make in attempting to
carry a pregnancy to term, and infringes on her right to privacy and
bodily autonomy.... Logic does not demand that a pregnant woman
be treated in a court of law as a stranger to her developing fetus ....
It would be a legal fiction to treat the fetus as a separate legal person
with rights hostile to and assertable against its mother. The relation-
ship between a pregnant woman and her fetus is unlike the
relationship between any other plaintiff and defendant. No other
plaintiff depends exclusively on any other defendant for everything
necessary for life itself. No other defendant must go through biologi-
cal changes of the most profound type, possibly at the risk of her own
life, in order to bring forth an adversary into the world. It is, after all,
the whole life of the pregnant woman which impacts on the devel-
opment of the fetus. As opposed to the third-party' defendant, it is the
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fact that it placed the interests of the fetus above those of the mother
and unconstitutionally penalized women for their decision to carry
their pregnancies to term. °
The United States Supreme Court has consistently rejected
claims that fetal rights should trump maternal rights, declining invi-
tations to find a compelling state interest in protecting viable fetuses
that would require sanctions or compulsory treatment of the
mother.81 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court maintained that "the
word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
include the unborn., 28 2 This holding was reaffirmed by Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey, in which Justice Stevens opined that "as a matter of
federal constitutional law, a developing organism that is not yet a
'person' does not have what is sometimes described as a 'right to
life.' This has been and, by the Court's holding today, remains a
fundamental premise of our constitutional law governing reproduc-
tive autonomy. ',23 While acknowledging that a state may have an
"important and legitimate interest in potential life," the Court has
steadfastly rejected claims that fetuses are entitled to the same con-
stitutional status as women.284
mother's every waking and sleeping moment which, for better or
worse, shapes the prenatal environment which forms the world for
the developing fetus. That this is so is not a pregnant woman's fault:
it is a fact of life.
531 N.E.2d 355, 359-60 (Ill. 1988).
280. See Roberts, supra note 80, at 1958 ("The same proliferation of prosecutions
against affluent, white women who abuse alcohol or prescription medication would
be unthinkable. Society is much more willing to condone the punishment of poor
women of color who fail to meet the middle-class ideal of motherhood. Thus, the
very conception of using drugs during pregnancy as a crime is rooted in race.").
281. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913-14 (1992) (holding that
developing fetuses are not recognized as persons under the law); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779 n.8 (1986)
(striking down statutes that compromised maternal health in favor of fetal survival);
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397 (1979) (invalidating a statute that failed to
guarantee that a woman's health always prevail over the life and health of her fetus).
282. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1972).
283. 505 U.S. at 913-14 (Stevens, J., concurring).
284. See id. at 853, 871, 873. While the Court ruled that "the State has legitimate
interest from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting ... the life of the fetus that
may become a child," Id. at 846, Justice Stevens explicitly noted:
The suggestion that states are free to declare a fetus a person .... as-
sumes that a state can curtail some persons' constitutional rights by
adding new persons to the constitutional population .... If a fetus is
not part of the constitutional population, under the national consti-
tutional arrangement, then states have no power to overrule the
national arrangement by themselves declaring that fetuses have
rights competitive with the constitutional rights of pregnant women.
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The mother-fetus relationship is unlike any other recognized in
law and thus cannot be reconciled within the adversarial legal
framework. The imposition of criminal sanctions against a pregnant
woman for actions that may detrimentally affect her developing
fetus creates a dichotomy between the two where the rights of the
entity she carries can be inimical to her own. This absurdity can lead
to unintended and dangerous consequences. Virtually anything a
pregnant woman does affects her fetus either positively or nega-
tively. As a result, any act or omission on her part would have the
potential of rendering her criminally liable for child abuse.'
The question of a pregnant woman's medical care is illustrative
of this dilemma. Any treatment she elects to receive to safeguard her
own health could place her fetus in jeopardy. For example, many
modem medical treatments and therapies have far-reaching conse-
quences that are antithetical to fetal well-being. According to a
coalition of health care providers and substance abuse treatment
organizations, "chemotherapy or radiation treatment for cancer, or
even the administration of drugs commonly used during labor and
delivery... can themselves cause fetal central nervous system depres-
sion, anoxia, hypothermia, low Apgar Scores, impaired metabolic
responses, and neurological depression.""'
Hence, any action or omission by the pregnant women could
constitute a breach of her duty to promote and protect the health of
her fetus. Creating an antagonistic relationship between a woman
and her fetus, while facilitating litigation in our oppositional system,
denies the reality of pregnancy. According to one court:
It would be a legal fiction to treat the fetus as a sepa-
rate legal person with rights hostile to and assertable
against its mother .... No other defendant must go
through biological changes of the most profound type,
possibly at the risk of her own life, in order to bring
forth an adversary into the world. It is, after all, the
whole life of the pregnant woman which impacts on
the development of the fetus. As opposed to the third-
party defendant, it is the mother's every waking and
sleeping moment which, for better or worse, shapes
the prenatal environment which forms the world for
Id. at 913 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Ronald
Dworkin, Unremunerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. CHI.
L. REv. 38, 400-01 (1992)).
285. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1988) (refusing to recognize
tort of maternal prenatal negligence).
286. See Lindesmith Center Amicus Brief, supra note 158, at 147 n.20.
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the developing fetus. That this is so is not a pregnant
woman's fault: it is a fact of life.87
Not only did the implementors of the Policy allow fetal rights
to overwhelm maternal rights, they empowered government to
scrutinize any decision made by a pregnant woman and thus vio-
lated her constitutionally protected right to privacy and liberty.
The right to privacy in reproductive decision-making, guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, encom-
passes a woman's right to become pregnant and to carry a
pregnancy to term as well as her right to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy. 2' By penalizing women who gave birth and preventing
chemically-dependent women from making independent choices,
free from government coercion, about whether or not to carry their
pregnancies to term, the Policy violated the right to privacy guar-
anteed by the United States Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally held that
the right to procreate is a fundamental civil liberty.29 The Constitu-
tion not only protects women from being forced to terminate wanted
pregnancies, it also protects them from measures penalizing them
for carrying their pregnancies to term.290 Despite the well-
documented fact that maternal and infant health are better served by
287. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360; see also State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1997)
(not allowing an expectant mother to be criminally charged with the death of her
child resulting from self-inflicted injuries during the third trimester of pregnancy).
288. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 859.
289. See Cary v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 713 (1976); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S.
123, 127 n.4 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1985)
(holding that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is violated
where a suspended sentence is conditioned on the defendant's castration).
290. See Arnold v. Board of Educ. of Escambia County, 880 F.2d 305, 311 (11th Cir.
1989) ("There simply can be no question that the individual must be free to decide to
carry a child to term."). Most recently, in Casey, the Supreme Court noted that its
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), "has been sensibly relied upon to
counter" attempts to interfere with a woman's decision to become pregnant or to
carry to term. 505 U.S. at 859. Similarly, in Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974), the Court declared unconstitutional a rule mandating that pregnant
school teachers take unpaid maternity leave at an arbitrary time during their preg-
nancy. The Court acknowledged that "freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment," and struck down the rule because, "[bly acting to
penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive mater-
nity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of these
protected freedoms." 414 U.S. at 639-40. Certainly, the threat of prosecution and
imprisonment constitutes a far greater burden on the exercise of protected reproduc-
tive freedoms than an excessively restrictive maternity leave policy. See MICH
REPORT VOL. III, supra note 30, at 10.
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drug treatment, counseling and the provision of prenatal care, the
implementers of the Policy chose to prosecute and incarcerate sub-
stance-dependent women for becoming pregnant and bearing
children. The women prosecuted under the Policy would not have
been prosecuted or even charged with a crime had they terminated
their pregnancies. Hence, they were prosecuted for exercising their
constitutional right to procreate.
The women subjected to the Policy were not only punished for
their decision to continue their pregnancies despite their addiction
problems, but were more severely penalized than they would have
been had they been convicted for other criminal offenses such as
drug possession. Because the women were punished more harshly
than either substance-dependent men29 or nonpregnant women, the
severity of the penalty can only be due to the fact that they were
pregnant. Moreover, the Policy's intrusion into women's lives to
deter behavior during pregnancy also implicated a woman's right to
bodily integrity and her fundamental and wide-ranging "right to be
let alone." 29 2 Because the fetus is physically part of a woman's body,
her every action during pregnancy could potentially become a mat-
ter of criminal investigation. 293
291. No male patients at MUSC were ever arrested under the Policy and charged
with possession based solely on a positive urine drug screen, see JA, supra note 5, at
1280, noted in Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 16, even though scientific research
has indicated that drug or alcohol use can damage sperm and thus substance-
addicted men who impregnate women can harm a developing fetus. See Ricardo A.
Yazigi et al., Demonstration of Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human Spermatozoa, 14
JAMA 1956 (1991); Ruth E. Little and Charles F. Sing, Father's Drinking and Infant
Birth Weight: Report of an Association, 36 TERATOLOGY 59 (1987).
292. Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
In this regard, the Supreme Court reiterated in Casey that:
It is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments in Roe v.
Wade, that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere
with a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood, as
well as bodily integrity.
505 U.S. at 849 (citations omitted).
293. See Whitner v. State of South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 788 (S.C. 1997) (Moore,
J., dissenting):
In construing this statute to include conduct not contemplated by the
legislature, the majority has rendered the statute vague and set for it-
self the task of determining what conduct is unlawful. Is a pregnant
woman's failure to obtain prenatal care unlawful? Failure to quit
smoking or drinking? Although the majority dismisses this issue as
not before it, the impact of today's decision is to render a pregnant
woman potentially criminally liable for myriad acts which the legis-
lature has not seen fit to criminalize. To ignore this 'down the road'
consequence in a case of this import is unrealistic.
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The unconstitutional burdens placed on Black women's
reproductive autonomy were further exacerbated by the fact that
there were no drug treatment facilities available to the pregnant
women targeted under the policy29 and that it is virtually impossible
to treat one's own addiction.95 Even the sole, and in this case unde-
sired, option of terminating one's pregnancy in order to avoid the
terrible dilemma engendered by the Policy, was not a real option for
many of those targeted2 6 Thus MUSC's actions violated the
women's right to reproduce and established a pernicious and dis-
criminatory standard that allowed the State to determine which
women were fit to reproduce, thereby denying the humanity of
those prosecuted.297
See also Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (Ill. 1988) (holding that no cause
of action will lie for maternal prenatal negligence).
294. According to a 1991 report of the General Accounting Office (GAO), the most
significant barrier to women's drug treatment "is the lack of adequate treatment
capacity and appropriate services among the programs that will treat pregnant
women and mothers with young children. The demand for drug treatment uniquely
designed for pregnant women exceeds supply." ADMS BLOCK GRANT, supra note
200, at 4. A 1990 survey estimated "that less than 14 percent of the 4 million women
needing drug treatment received such treatment." Id. at 1.
295. Overcoming addiction is a long and arduous process. Holding someone
criminally liable in the middle of recovery undermines the entire process and ignores
the fact that drug-addiction is a disease, and that it is extremely difficult to overcome
on one's own. See PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY,
supra note 6, at 9; see also Drugs During Pregnancy: Tragic, But Not Criminal, N.J. L.J.,
May 31, 1990, at 9; Editorial, Pregnancy and Drugs: Should Addicts Be Forced to Abort?,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 5, 1989, at A22.
296. See Helen L. Smits, Women, Health, and Development: An American Perspective,
104 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 263, 263 (1986) (stating that women in the United
States have decreasing access to contraceptives). Moreover, there is no federal or
state funding for abortion services for poor women, like those targeted under the
Policy. An indigent Black woman who chooses to terminate a pregnancy in order to
escape prosecution is disproportionately more likely to be denied information on
how to secure an abortion and much less likely to receive governmental financial aid
for one. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (states participat-
ing in the Medicaid program are not obligated to fund medically necessary
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see also Dorothy Roberts, Rust v. Sulli-
van and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 596 (1993) (of the four
million women who used Title X clinics, 28% were Black, representing 53% of Black
women and just 32% of White women). Consequently, poor, Black women were
more likely to be forced to continue their pregnancies, and were then at higher risk
than White women of being prosecuted for maternal drug-dependence.
297. See Roberts, supra note 19, at 1463-64:
Such imposition of a government standard for childbearing is one
way that society denies the humanity of those who are different....
In other words, the prosecution of crack-addicted mothers infringes
upon both a mother's right to make decisions that determine her in-
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South Carolina has presented substance-dependent Black moth-
ers the Hobson's choice of foregoing necessary prenatal care,
terminating her pregnancy, or risking prosecution and incarcera-
298tion. Policies such as South Carolina's are not only ineffective in
treating substance addiction, but run counter to efforts to promote
the health of mothers, fetuses and infants. The Policy was thus little
more than an experiment conducted, without their consent, on poor,
Black women to determine whether threats of prosecution would
alter maternal behavior.
CONCLUSION
Popularly held and firmly entrenched beliefs about the role and
proper position of Black women in society have deep historical roots
reaching back into slavery. This matrix of historical memory and
contemporary images have shaped socio-political attitudes towards
Black motherhood for centuries. Enduring negative iconographic
representations of Black maternity illustrate and underscore the
continuing impact of this country's searing legacy of oppression.
The extent to which Black women have been defined by pejorative
representations and stereotypes, coupled with the degree to which
many Americans have internalized and, consciously or uncon-
sciously, act in reliance upon these debilitating beliefs, informs the
discussion of the origin and true significance and effect of the Policy.
To be sure, the Policy was intimately interconnected to larger
cultural and social norms.2 The drafters of the Policy integrated
dividual identity and her right to be respected equally as a human
being by recognizing the value of her motherhood.
298. Numerous courts dismissing prosecutions against women who gave birth
despite an addiction problem have recognized the possibility of coerced abortions.
See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992) ("Prosecution of pregnant
women for engaging in activities harmful to their fetuses or newborns may also
unwittingly increase the incidence of abortion."); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140,
1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("Potential criminal liability would also encourage
addicted women to terminate or conceal their pregnancies."); People v. Morabito,
580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Geneva City Ct. 1992), aff'd slip op. (Ontario County Ct. 1992);
People v. Bremer, 90-32227-FH slip op. at 14 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991), appeal
dismissed, No. 137619 (Mich. App. July 14, 1992); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No.
87970 slip op. at 9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990). Indeed, a policy of prosecution
may have resulted in at least one coerced abortion. In February 1992, a woman was
charged with reckless endangerment because she was allegedly sniffing paint fumes
while she was pregnant. Twelve days after her arrest she obtained an abortion.
Shortly after the abortion the charges were dropped. See Gail Stewart Hand, Women
or Children First?, GRAND FORKS HERALD, July 12, 1992, at 1.
299. Americans share a historical experience that has caused individuals within
this culture to irrationally and often unknowingly attach significance to race See
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their own moral values and biases into the formulation of the
program, without expressly articulating their belief that indigent
Black women are immoral and therefore unfit mothers. Not only did
the ill-conceived Policy discriminate against Black women, it also
seriously threatened the health of these women and their children.
Rather than deal with the real issues of poverty, racism and sexism
that were conspicuously present, or the fact that the targeted women
lacked meaningful access to birth control, prenatal care, and drug-
treatment services, the Policy framers determined that being ad-
dicted to drugs while carrying a pregnancy to term constituted per se
child endangerment.
Instead of fulfilling its mission to aid those who sought medical
treatment, MUSC chose to penalize substance-dependent pregnant
women for their efforts to raise a family and overcome difficult
health problems. The decision to criminalize pregnancy and child-
bearing for substance-dependent Black women both dehumanizes
and degrades those whom society sees as unfit and undeserving of
being mothers. In so doing, the Policy continued the unwritten social
policy of undermining and discouraging Black motherhood.
Lawrence, supra note 173, at 328-344 (describing the psychological dynamics of
unconscious racism).
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